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Background: Worry is theorised to function as a form of cognitive or experiential avoidance wherein an 
individual uses repetitive thinking in an attempt to avoid a future event or an aversive internal experience. 
There is evidence of a closer link between non-verbal thought (e.g. mental images) and emotion, physiology 
and behaviour than with verbal thought. Based on findings that worry is predominantly a verbal-linguistic 
activity, with less imagery occurring during worry episodes than during relaxation; it is theorised that worriers 
may move from non-verbal to verbal thought in order to avoid the greater arousal associated with non-verbal 
thought intrusions. This carries with it the unintended consequence of reducing emotional processing, leading 
to a subsequent increase in intrusive thoughts. Whilst cognitive science has emphasised the content of 
cognition and how this links to emotion, the psychological flexibility model suggests that content is less 
important than how we relate to our cognitive events. The degree to which we get entangled in our thinking, 
lack perspective on our thoughts and the degree to which cognition comes to regulate our behaviour over 
other sources is known as cognitive fusion. It is postulated that some individuals may be more prone to 
avoiding internal experiences due to the stance they take toward these experiences. In the long-term, worry 
should lead to a reduction in the experience of intrusive images and memories and an increase in intrusive 
thoughts; and  this  relationship  should  vary  depending  on  an  individual’s  stance in relation to their internal 
experiences. The purpose of the current study is to explore the experience of intrusive memories, images and 
thoughts in an older adult sample, and the relationship of these experiences to level of worry, cognitive fusion 
and psychological inflexibility. 
Method: Sixty-two community dwelling older adults were involved in the study. Each completed 
questionnaire measures to assess level of trait worry, depression, cognitive fusion and psychological 
inflexibility, as well as an interview to determine whether diagnostic criteria were met for any mood or anxiety 
disorder and to complete an interview exploring the experience of intrusive memories, thoughts and images.  
Findings: Higher levels of trait worry were strongly associated with higher levels of cognitive fusion and 
psychological inflexibility. Intrusive memories, images and thoughts were all reported in low levels across the 
sample. Level of worry was positively associated with the severity but not the occurrence of intrusive 
memories and thoughts. Higher levels of psychological inflexibility were associated with less occurrence of 
intrusive memories and images; whereas higher levels of cognitive fusion were associated with the increased 
occurrence of intrusive images. Higher levels of worry, cognitive fusion and psychological inflexibility were all 
associated with increased severity of intrusive thoughts. The findings are discussed in relation to previous 
research and to the Avoidance Theory and Acceptance Model of GAD. Implications are considered for further 
research and clinical applications. 
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Psychological enquiry has progressed through different stages of what is seen as the main focus of 
inquiry: through behaviourism, where behaviour was emphasised over thoughts; to the rise of 
cognitive behavioural traditions, where the content of thought became all important; now moving 
into so called third wave approaches where there is increasing recognition of the importance of the 
process of thinking and the way we relate to our thoughts, or the stance we take to them. It is no 
longer just what we think that is important, but how we think it.  
According to the Dual Coding Theory (Paivio, 1971) we are capable of thinking in two distinct forms, 
verbally and non-verbally. These forms of thought are related to different functions (Paivio, 1991), 
have different associations with emotional responding (Holmes & Mathews, 2010) and are subject to 
individual differences in preference for processing style (form of thinking) (Richardson, 1977). 
Thoughts originating from either system can be initiated under voluntary control or arise outside of 
this control, intruding into awareness. The extent to which these intrusive thoughts are problematic 
may   relate   to  an   individual’s beliefs about their thoughts and the ways in which they respond to 
them. 
Worry   is   defined   as   ‘a   predominantly   verbal-linguistic attempt to avoid future aversive   events’  
(Borkovec, 1994, p28). It is known that worry activity, involves predominantly verbal thinking 
(Borkovec & Inz, 1990) and that intrusive thoughts are a common feature (Borkovec et al., 1983). It 
has been proposed that worry may serve as a form of cognitive avoidance of negative emotional 
experience triggered by external or internal stimuli (such as intrusive images) by switching from non-
verbal to verbal processing (Borkovec, 1994). It has been further suggested that this represents a 
form of experiential avoidance that may be linked to the way in which individuals relate to their 
internal experiences (Hayes et al., 1996). 
Across the lifespan it is argued that the repeated practice of processing habits can lead the experience 
of  worry  to  ‘grow’  (Hirsch & Mathews, 2012). Older adults have been found to use fewer different 
strategies for coping with worry than have younger adults (Hunt et al., 2003). This is consistent with 
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a consolidation of ways of processing information and coping with stressors over a lifetime. It is 
predicted that links between intrusions, worry and the relationship with, or stance taken to, internal 
experiences will be most clearly seen in this age group. 
This study seeks to explore the experience of intrusive cognitions in the forms of thoughts, images 
and memories in older adults across the spectrum of worry. Additionally, it is intended to explore 
how  intrusions  are  impacted  by  an  individual’s relationship with their internal experiences and how 
much they worry. 
This thesis will begin by discussing mental representation and the basic forms thought can take. It 
will then turn to look at individual differences in mental representation and how mode of processing 
impacts emotion. This will be followed by consideration of another dimension of the thinking process, 
the extent to which thoughts are intentional (under our voluntary control) or intrusive (outside of 
voluntary control). There will then follow an overview of the concept of worry before description and 
critical analysis of two complementary theories of worry and generalised anxiety disorder that have 
direct bearing on this study. The nature and frequency of worry will then be considered across the 
lifespan, and the introduction will conclude with an outline of the aims and hypotheses of the present 
study. 
1.2 Mental Representation 
In order to begin to understand how the thinking process itself may impact our psychological well-
being, it is necessary first to consider the different forms that thinking may take. This section will 
summarise the Dual Coding Theory (Paivio, 1971) and the supporting evidence as well as briefly 
considering major alternatives. 
The basis of Dual Coding Theory (DCT) is  that  ‘cognition  is  served  by  two  modality-specific systems 
that  are  experientially  derived  and  differentially  specialized’  (Paivio, 1991). The two systems: verbal 
and non-verbal, deal with linguistic and non-linguistic material, respectively. Paivio (1991) stressed 
that DCT may more properly be referred to as a multiple coding theory as the non-verbal system 
encompasses the different modalities of all sensorimotor systems (including, visual, auditory, and 
haptic or motor). It is visual imagery that has however, received the most attention empirically, which 




The verbal and non-verbal systems are proposed to be functionally independent, yet interconnected 
and able to operate alone or in parallel. The systems can be activated in three ways: directly by 
external stimuli; through referential interconnections, such that a name evokes the image of the 
object it refers to and vice versa; and through associative interconnections, the spread of association 
within a system. An example might be seeing the word dog, this may trigger associated words through 
a spread of association in the verbal system, and, through referential interconnections, trigger images 
associated with dogs, which may trigger further non-linguistic or further linguistic associated 
material. It has been demonstrated that the non-verbal system produces superior recall in memory 
experiments, and that the two systems operating in parallel produce additive effects, over and above 
the results of one system operating alone (Paivio, 1991). 
Individuals differ in the extent to which they habitually employ one system or the other (Paivio & 
Harshman, 1983). The predominant use of one system or the other is also determined, among other 
variables, by the level of abstractness (referring to ideas or qualities rather than material objects; 
Crozier et al., 2008) or concreteness (relating to things that can be perceived by the senses; Crozier 
et al., 2008) of the subject matter. Imagery strategies are found to lend themselves better to 
consideration of concrete items whereas verbal strategies predominate for abstract items (Paivio, 
1991). 
A large base of empirical support has accrued over the years since the theory was first put forward 
(Paivio, 1971). The theory originally arose from empirical findings of the superiority of recall of 
concrete versus abstract words (e.g. Paivio, 1965), and that this held true when controlling for the 
meaningfulness of words (Paivio et al., 1968). A factor analytical study including multiple variables 
thought to influence recall, found that imageability was the best predictor of recall by far, even 
surpassing concreteness (Paivio, 1968). Further work testing the hypothesis including: the use of 
pictures versus words (Dilley & Paivio, 1968); experimental manipulation of learning strategy 
together with strategy reports (Paivio & Yuille, 1969); and repetition trials, demonstrating the 
additive effect of parallel processing (Paivio, 1975), has further contributed to the evidence base for 
the theory. 
A major criticism of DCT was that the findings could also be explained by depth or elaboration of 
processing as in the Levels of Processing Model (Craik & Lockhart, 1972) which holds that recall of an 
item is dependent upon the depth of processing it has been subjected to. This therefore eliminates 
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the need for a separate non-verbal system. Indeed, deep imagery coding of words is able to eliminate 
the superiority of picture stimuli in recall tests, however, when opportunities for elaboration are 
minimised, or when non-imagery elaboration is used, the picture superiority re-emerges (Paivio, 
1975).  A direct test of predictions arising from both models revealed that both phonemic and 
semantic processing,  which  represent  different  ‘depths’  of  processing,  produced  equivalent  levels  of  
recall as predicted by DCT as both conditions required naming, and this recall was superior to a visual 
condition that did not require naming (D'Agostino et al., 1977). The authors conclude that depth of 
processing alone is not sufficient to explain these findings without also considering the dual coding 
perspective.  
Context Availability Theory (Schwanenflugel & Shoben, 1983) has likewise been put forward as an 
alternative explanation for faster recall of concrete versus abstract items. The theory asserts that 
concrete nouns are recognised faster than abstract nouns due to greater availaibility of contextual 
information for concrete words, rather than the non-verbal system proposed by DCT. Abstract nouns 
are therefore capable of equivalent recognition times when presented in meaningful context, with 
sufficient verbal information. Numerous studies using different manipulations of abstractness and 
contextual variables have failed to support predictions made by the model. An example comes from 
Sadoski et al. (2000) who presented sentences and paragraphs varying in abstractness but matched 
for verbal contextual factors, a large effect of concreteness was found as would be expected 
according to DCT. Similarly, concrete and abstract words that were presented, either within 
meaningful sentences or anomalous ones intended to inhibit relational processing, again led to 
superior recall for concrete words, whereas those presented within the meaningful context would be 
expected, according to the Context Availability Theory, to produce superior recall (Richardson, 2003). 
Taken together these findings indicate that contextual availability, whilst it may contribute to 
understanding of recall, is not, on its own a sufficient explanation. 
In summary, dual coding theory asserts that human beings are capable of thinking in both verbal and 
non-verbal forms. These systems may operate independently but are also interconnected and can 
operate in parallel. The theory is both grounded in empirical findings and has a large and robust 
evidence base. The extent to which one processing strategy is employed over the other will vary as a 
function of task and individual preference. The next section will focus on individual differences in 
habitual mode of processing. 
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1.2.1 Habitual mode of processing 
Put forward by Paivio (1971) and expanded on by others (e.g. Richardson, 1977), is the idea that 
individuals differ in their habitual mode of processing, generally referred to as the verbaliser – 
visualiser dimension. Interest in individual differences in processing modes is not new. As long ago as 
1932, Bartlett described that those classified as visualisers tended to utilise a more subjective, self-
orientation in problem solving, whereas verbalisers showed a tendency to use a more objective task 
orientation (Bartlett, 1932). 
Differences in habitual mode of processing are supported by physiological studies, using breathing 
patterns, whereby visual imagery is associated with more regular breathing than is verbal thought 
(Richardson, 1977). The distinction is also supported by neuroscience findings with the authors 
concluding  that  ‘modality-specific cortical activity underlies processing in visual and verbal cognitive 
styles’  (Kraemer et al., 2009). A correlation was found between self-reported preference for verbal 
processing and activity in the supramarginal gyrus, whereas a self-reported preference for visual 
processing was associated with activity in the fusiform gyrus. This is of particular interest given the 
extensive interconnectedness of the fusiform gyrus with the amygdala, part of the limbic system, 
important in emotion (Freese & Amaral, 2006). 
In summary, individual differences in habitual mode of processing are supported by research findings 
and relate to different patterns of activation in brain areas. Visual processing, as opposed to verbal, 
shows activation in brain regions known to be highly interconnected with areas associated with 
emotion processing. The focus will now turn to the implications of the use of one or other form of 
processing, in particular the links between type of processing and emotion. 
1.2.2 Sequelae of mode of processing 
It is common for research to focus on visual imagery as, arguably the most accessible form of non-
verbal cognition. Mental images, however, can occur in all sensory modalities and are primarily 
sensory-perceptual representations (Holmes & Mathews, 2010),  a  “seeing  with   the  mind’s  eye  or  
hearing  with  the  mind’s  ear”  (Kosslyn et al., 2001, p 635). In contrast, verbal thought relies on human 
language and may be described as more closely resembling talking to oneself. 
There are a number of important differences in how the two systems process information. Whilst 
images are constrained by their nature as concrete representations (i.e. things that can be perceived 
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by the senses), verbal thought has the freedom to be more abstract (i.e. existing in thought without 
a physical existence), therein lying its great adaptive value in being able to go beyond the constraints 
of the imageable. Verbal thought is however, confined by the structure of language to sequential 
processing, as opposed to the synchronous processing of non-verbal material (Paivio, 1991).  
A key difference, in consideration of the possible relation of modes of thinking to mental distress, is 
how the two systems relate to emotion. The Dual Coding Theory suggests that emotional reactions 
are learned experientially and as such are linked to nonverbal objects and events. Through further 
conditioning, words may come to acquire affective qualities as part of their referential meaning 
(Paivio, 2013).  
It has long been held that imagery is closely linked to emotion. Holmes and Mathews (2010) have 
gone beyond this general assertion to suggest that at least three possible ways exist in which imagery 
can evoke emotion. The first of these is by influencing emotional systems within the brain that 
respond to specific sensory signals (sight, sound, smell etc.) which may be externally generated or, 
internally generated (i.e. imagery) (Holmes & Mathews, 2010). It is proposed that basic emotional 
brain systems, such as fear, may respond directly to information in sensory form. This would provide 
an advantage in allowing an immediate response to threat without accessing slower, deliberate 
thought processes. Consistent with this, it has been reported that basic emotional responses can be 
triggered by stimuli outside of conscious awareness (Ohman & Mineka, 2001). Research findings 
suggest that both cortical and sub-cortical pathways are involved in responding to fear stimuli. This 
is supported by the finding that the way in which a fear stimulus is processed (attention focused on 
emotional or non-emotional aspects) modulates activation of brain regions associated with fear and 
defensive reactions (Mathews et al., 2004), with the extent of modulation depending on how 
perceptually demanding the task is (Pessoa et al, 2002). In addition, anxiety sensitive individuals 
showed greater activation of associated brain regions indicating greater fear response to stimuli 
(Mathews et al., 2004). 
Emotional systems within the brain (particularly for fear) can respond directly to sensory information 
from either external stimuli, or internally generated images; and this response can be modulated by 
thinking processes. Thus, it is plausible that individuals experiencing distress due to internally 
generated imagery may use conscious thinking processes to shift attention in order to avoid the 
associated emotion. That the response of brain regions was greater in anxiety sensitive individuals 
13 
 
may suggest that these individuals may be more motivated to shift their attention in order to reduce 
distress in response to stimuli to which fight and flight responses are not available.    
The second proposed mechanism by which imagery is proposed to evoke emotion is, by virtue of 
similar brain activation patterns, imagery evokes a broad range of emotions as would currently 
occurring emotional events. The overlap between processing of sensory perceptions and mental 
images is demonstrated by mutual interference in tasks involving both processes (Baddley & 
Andrade, 2000; Segal & Fusella, 1969) as well as neuro-imaging studies (e.g. Kosslyn & Thompson, 
2003; Kosslyn et al., 2001). Furthermore, it is suggested that mental imagery and direct sensory 
perceptions may more directly activate brain systems underlying emotions than later evolving 
symbolic representations (i.e. verbally based representational systems). Studies have demonstrated 
the activation of brain areas involved with emotion in response to imaged as well as actual stimuli 
such as facial expressions (Kim et al., 2007) and the imagination of past (Cabeza & St. Jaques, 2007) 
and future events (Sharot et al., 2007).  
The potential of being able to create an image rich in sensory and emotional detail to project 
ourselves into the past or the future in terms of planning, decision making or reflecting on past 
experiences is vast. However, individuals who have a tendency to take their thoughts literally or as if 
they were, in fact the external events they represent, may experience considerable distress 
associated with such mental events, particularly if they are experienced as difficult to control. 
The generation of emotions linked to past events leads to the third proposed way in which imagery 
elicits emotion: through reactivation of memories containing emotional material. It is suggested that, 
in the reactivation of autobiographical memories of specific past events, there may be generation of 
new emotions as well as reactivation of emotions experienced at the time of the remembered event 
(Holmes & Mathews, 2010).  Holmes et al., (2008) asked participants to integrate pictures with 
captions by producing either an image or a verbal sentence. It was found that images tended to 
contain personal events and associated sensory information, whereas verbal sentences were based 
on generic semantic knowledge, consistent   with   Baddley’s   (1932)   findings   with   visualisers   and  
verbalisers. It was also found that the emotional effect of imagery was partially mediated by the 
occurence of autobiographical memories (Holmes et al., 2008). 
In a series of experiments aimed at exploring the relationship between mode of processing and 
emotion, an   ‘emotional   amplifier’   effect   of   imagery   was   found, compared to a focus on verbal 
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meaning of the same information (Holmes & Mathews, 2005). Furthermore, the effect was found to 
hold true for positive as well as negative emotions (Holmes et al., 2006). Interestingly the authors 
found an actual decrease in positive affect for the positive verbal condition, and this effect has since 
been replicated  (Holmes et al., 2009). The authors suggest that in some conditions verbal processing 
may actually undermine affective experience due to accessing conflicting information from semantic 
memory (Holmes et al., 2009; Holmes & Mathews, 2010). A difficulty with this type of research arises 
from the possibility of parallel processing. It cannot be ruled out that the effects of imagery are the 
additive result of verbal and imagery processing. In further experiments designed specifically to test 
this, the results clearly showed that higher ratings of emotions were associated with the extent of 
imagery use but not the extent of verbal representation (Holmes & Mathews, 2010).  
Further support for the differential abilities of imagery and verbal representations to evoke an 
emotional response comes from measuring  individuals’  physiological  response. This also overcomes 
some of the difficulties of reliance on self-report for both mode of processing and emotional response 
which  may  be  open   to   individuals’   expectancy   that   they   ‘should’   experience   a   greater   emotional  
response to imagery versus verbal processing. An oft cited study is that of Vrana et al. (1986), in which 
a greater physiological response (heart rate) was found for fear imagery as opposed to neutral 
imagery or verbal processing (through silent repetition). A difficulty found with use of a repeated 
measures design was that when the imagery condition was presented first, increases in heart rate 
elicited continued during the verbal condition, which the authors speculate was due to continued 
imagery through parallel processing. A replication of the study using independent samples would 
seem to be warranted to disentangle the findings. 
The link between imagery and emotion has implications for emotional distress and, potentially, the 
development or maintenance of psychological problems. Given that non-verbal thought and emotion 
are closely linked, it seems plausible that the form of thinking (i.e. verbal or non-verbal), may 
influence the level of distress associated with unpleasant thoughts and therefore an individuals 
response to their thoughts and the production of future imagery. In line with this hypothesis are 
findings that a tendency to avoid emotional expression was associated with lower levels of details in 
memories and images which may be suggestive of avoidance of emotions associated with the 
imagined content (D'Argembeau & Van Der Linden, 2006). 
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The way in which an individual responds to their thoughts, may influence the form and frequency of 
subsequent thoughts (e.g. the paradoxical rebound effect resulting from suppression; Wegner et al., 
1987). The form and frequency of subsequent thoughts and the extent to which they are under 
voluntary control or are intrusive may influence the level of control one perceives themselves to have 
over thinking and in turn, their level of psychological distress.  
In summary, the degree to which individuals engage in verbal or non-verbal processing styles, as well 
as the degree to which these thoughts are under voluntary control may be important dimensions in 
understanding psychological distress. The next section explores the second of these dimensions in 
thinking; the extent to which thoughts occur outside of our voluntary control.   
1.3 Intrusive versus intentional thought 
Thinking is a powerful tool. Our ability to consider, ponder, plan, weigh up alternatives and revisit 
experiences through memory, is perhaps what has led human beings to be so evolutionarily 
successful. Not all thought, however, is intentional, by contrast thoughts described as intrusive or 
those  that  ‘spring  to  mind  unbidden’, occur outside of voluntary control (Holmes & Mathews, 2010).  
This form of unwanted thought features in a range of clinical conditions such as post traumatic stress 
disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, depression, anxiety (Reynolds & Brewin, 1998) and 
insomnia and worry (Borkovec, 1985). Intrusive thoughts are normal and almost universal, with up 
to 99% of participants reporting experiencing them (Freeston et al., 1991) and 13% experiencing 
them frequently (Belloch et al., 2004). Furthermore, intrusive thoughts in the general population and 
clinical obsessions are not distinguishable in terms of content (e.g. Reynolds & Salkovskis, 1991; 
Belloch et al. 2004). Rather, differences are thought to lie in the processing of intrusions, response 
styles (Freeston & Ladouceur, 1993) and appraisals of the significance of the intrusion (Salkovskis et 
al., 1995).  
An investigation of responses to intrusive thoughts in a non-clinical sample revealed three main 
response styles: no effortful response; attentive thinking; and escape/avoidance. The two groups 
who employed effortful strategies (attentive thinking and escape/avoidance) were found to be more 
anxious and have more difficulty removing intrusions (Freeston et al., 1991). In a follow up study 
linking response style with appraisals it was found that intrusions appraised as low probability and 
high disapproval tended to trigger escape/ avoidance and those appraised as high probability, low 
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disapproval tended to trigger attentive thinking. The authors suggest that these patterns may link to 
obsessive-compulsive problems and worry respectively (Freeston & Ladouceur, 1993). 
The appraisal of intrusive thoughts is one aspect of meta-cognition. Meta-cognition may be defined 
as:   “stable   knowledge   or beliefs   about  one’s   cognitive   system   and   knowledge   about   factors   that  
affect the functioning of the system; the regulation and awareness of the current state of cognition, 
and appraisal of the significance of  thoughts  and  memories”  (Wells, 1995, p. 302). The concept of 
meta-cognition is being applied to a growing number of conditions, most notably, worry in the form 
of meta-worry, or worry about worrying. In an exploration of meta-cognition, intrusive thoughts and 
worry and obsessional thinking (both of which conditions feature negative thought intrusions); meta-
worry and thought suppression were found to significantly predict worry, whereas meta-worry and 
cognitive self-consciousness (awareness of thinking) were found to predict obsessional thoughts in a 
non-clinical sample (de Bruin, Muris, & Rassin, 2007).  
Another form of meta-cognition, the degree to which an individual perceives their thoughts as having 
special significance has been termed thought-action fusion (TAF)(Shafran et al., 1996). TAF is thought 
to have two components, firstly the belief that having a thought makes an event more likely to occur 
and secondly, that having a thought is morally equivalent to committing a forbidden action (Shafran 
et al., 1996). Studies have found that TAF is higher in obsessional samples (Shafran et al., 1996; Smari 
& Holmsteinsson, 2001) and that experimentally induced TAF is related to an increase in frequency 
of intrusive thoughts as well as associated distress (Rassin et al., 1999). Related to TAF, it is suggested 
that an individual may feel compelled to act on a thought owing to to the belief that one is responsible 
for harm unless steps have been taken to prevent it (Salkovskis, 1985). 
The beliefs an individual holds about thought intrusions they experience and how they respond to 
these experiences based on their appraisals, influence both the occurrence and severity of further 
intrusive thoughts. Whilst intrusive thoughts are normal and almost universal, they can become a 
distressing part of psychopathology due to the stance an individual takes to these experiences. 
Intrusive thoughts have been little studied across the lifespan, although what there is suggests that 
intrusive thoughts remain a common, albeit less frequent phenomenon into later life (Magee & 
Teachman, 2012; Brose et al., 2011). The use of suppression in response to these thoughts has been 
found to remain common with increasing age. Older adults, however, report greater suppression 
effort (Magee & Teachman, 2012). It is thought that this explains reports of less perceived control 
17 
 
over thoughts despite no difference in recurrence of thoughts between younger and older adults. 
Older adults also report higher levels of postive (Magee & Teachman, 2012) and lower levels of 
negative affect (Brose et al., 2011) associated with intrusive thoughts which is thought to reflect 
improved emotion regulation with age (Magee & Teachman, 2012). With regard to the appraisal of 
thoughts, the same study found that older adults tended to interpret the recurrence of thoughts as 
a sign of cognitive failure but not of moral failure, in contrast with younger adults (Magee & 
Teachman, 2012). 
Research indicating that older adults tend to use a smaller number of coping strategies compared to 
younger adults (Wisocki, 1994), may suggest that responses to both external and internal phenomena 
(such as thoughts and emotions) becomes less flexible with age through repeated use over a number 
of years. This may suggest that although intrusions are less frequently reported in this age group, 
patterns of appraisals and response may be more clear in older, rather than younger age groups. 
Whilst the majority of research examining intrusive thoughts does not make any distinction between 
the form the thought is experienced in, recent research by Haganaars et al. (2010) suggests that all 
thoughts may not be created equal. The research points to the idea that intrusive images and 
intrusive verbal-based thoughts may actually be considered as different phenomena that are 
developed under different circumstances and may arise from independent memory systems. They 
found that a traumatic stimulus (as opposed to a neutral one) provoked intrusive images, but not 
thoughts, as did conditions interferring with processing of the trauma (by preventing participants 
from moving around). Further more, peri-traumatic anxiety and horror were associated with a higher 
frequency of subsequent intrusive images, but not thoughts. The authors suggest that this may reflect 
a two way relationship between imagery and emotion, in that not only does mental imagery elicit 
emotion (Holmes & Mathews, 2010), but that emotions accompanying an experience have an impact 
on the subsequent development of intrusive images. Further research is needed to clarify whether 
there is a special relationship between the emotions of horror and anxiety/fear, as flight emotions 
and the development of intrusive images or whether this may apply to all negative emotions 
(Hagenaars et al., 2010). 
Intrusive mental imagery has been reported to accompany a number of anxiety conditions. Images 
tend to  be   specific   to   the   individual’s   concerns   such  as: health related in health anxiety (Wells & 
Hackman, 1993); involving social situations in social phobia (Hackmann, & McManus, 2000); and 
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agoraphobic situations in agoraphobia (Day, Holmes, & Hackmann, 2004). A common theme across 
the disorders is that many images involve memories of things experienced earlier in life. This raises 
questions as to the role images may play in clinical conditions where, rather than being situation 
specific, symptoms are present the majority of the time.  
Parallels have been drawn between thought processes in depression and generalised anxiety. Both 
involve repetitive negative thought; depressive rumination tends to be focused on the past, whereas 
worry tends to be foused on the future (Papageorgiou, 2006). Research on intrusive images in 
depression has revealed that some depressed individuals do experience intrusive images (just under 
half of those interviewed), with intrusive memories being most common (Patel et al., 2007). It has 
also been demonstrated through small case series that working therapeutically with these images 
can produce significant improvements in mood, without verbal challenging of negative beliefs 
(Wheatly et al., 2007; Brewin et al., 2009). It is known that intrusive thoughts are a prominent feature 
in excessive worry in general and generalised anxiety disorder in particular (e.g. Borkovec et al., 
1983). Less is known , however of the occurrence and possible role of intrusive images and memories 
in this condition.  
In summary, intrusive thoughts, images and memories are normal experiences that also play a role 
in clinical disorders including those associated with repetitive negative thoughts, either in the form 
of worry or rumination. It  is  thought  that  an  individual’s  relationship with their thoughts may impact 
the degree to which they are experienced as problematic. Whilst intrusive images are implicated in a 
number of anxiety disorders and depression, less is known about how they may manifest in severe 
generalised worry as seen in generalised anxiety disorder (GAD). 
The next section turns to look at worry, beginning by looking at worry as a general concept before 
considering the relationship of worry to anxiety and normal and pathological forms of worry before 
turning to theoretical understandings of worry and GAD. 
1.4 Worry 
It is, perhaps, due to the fact that worry is a part of everyday human experience that it did not receive 
much attention, as a psychological phenomenon, in its own  right  until  the  1980’s.  It  was  a  team  at  
Penn State University who first turned their attention to worry, and contributed a huge amount to 
our current understanding (e.g. Borkovec et al., 1983).  
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This chapter will attempt firstly, to define worry, then describe what we know of this phenomenon 
in relation to anxiety and its normal and pathological forms. Attention will then turn to theories 
contributing to our understanding of why and how we worry, finally considering how worry manifests 
across the lifespan.  
Defined simply, worry is  ‘a  predominantly  verbal-linguistic  attempt  to  avoid  future  aversive  events’  
(Borkovec , 1994, p.28). The content typically concerns future events whose outcomes are uncertain, 
but contain the possiblity of one or more negative outcomes (Sibrava & Borkovec, 2006). It is a unique 
and, at the same time, universal (or very nearly so) human experience. A form of repetitive negative 
thinking, it plays a central role in anxiety disorders as well as varying continuously across the normal 
population (Ruscio et al., 2001).  
1.4.1 Worry and anxiety 
Worry, as would be expected, is closely linked to anxiety and for a long time was considered as the 
cognitive manifestation of anxiety (e.g. Mathews, 1990). However, there is evidence that the two can 
be considered as separate constructs. The original validation study for the Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire reported correlations with a measure of trait anxiety of 0.69 and state anxiety of 0.49 
(Meyer et al., 1990), thus immediately allying worry more closely with trait anxiety than current 
emotional state, and suggesting that, whilst related, trait anxiety and worry are not one and the 
same. 
Davey et al. (1992) described the unique sources of variance contributing to both trait anxiety and 
worry. Worry was found to be characterised by: problem-focussed coping strategies; and information 
seeking and monitoring coping strategies. Trait anxiety however, was characterised by: poor 
problem-solving confidence; poor perceived personal control; responsibility for negative outcomes; 
and avoidance or emotion-focused coping strategies. Both were associated with a tendency to define 
events as threats.  
The above findings suggest that worry may occur in the absence of anxiety and, when it does, may 
take the form of an adaptive problem-solving process (Davey et al., 1992). Normal worry has been 
defined  as  ‘mild,  transient,  generally  limited  in  scope, and experienced by the majority of individuals’  
(Ruscio , 2002).  
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1.4.2 Pathological worry 
Normal and pathological worry exist, not as discrete constructs, but as different points on a 
continuum (Ruscio et al., 2001). Whilst a great deal of worry research has focused on GAD, 
pathological worry is not confined to this disorder. In fact, in one study, only 20% of those 
experiencing pathological levels of worry met diagnostic criteria for GAD (Ruscio, 2002). It is 
suggested therefore, that there may be additional factors operating on worry in the context of GAD 
(Holaway et al., 2006) and therefore caution should be used in intepreting the results of studies that 
have employed different criteria for defining pathological worry.  
Whilst worry is central to the current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV) (1994) diagnosis of 
GAD, it is thought to play a role more widely, across the anxiety disorders and depression. Whilst 
GAD is associated with high levels of non-specific worry, in other anxiety disorders worries may take 
on a specific focus such as social worry in social anxiety disorder or health worry in panic disorder 
(Wells & Carter, 2001). Elevated levels of worry are also found in Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) 
(Yook et al., 2010) which is unsurprising given the frequent co-morbidity of GAD and MDD, the close 
association with rumination (Papageorgiou, 2006) and that worry induction is found to elicit almost 
equal levels of both anxious and depressed affect (Borkovec, 1994). 
In summary, worry is a near universal phenomenon which consists of repetitive negative thought in 
which verbal-linguistic activity predominates. Whilst closely linked to anxiety, worry may be 
considered a separate construct with its own unique sources of variance and may be adaptive under 
certain circumstances. Normal and pathological worry, exist on a continuum throughout the general 
population, with pathological worry contributing to a wide range of clinical anxiety and mood 
disorders. The next section will outline and critically examine the evidence for two major theories of 
worry and GAD as they apply to this study. 
1.5 Theoretical Understanding of Worry and Generalised Anxiety Disorder 
There are many different theoretical accounts explaining all or part of the worry process. It is beyond 
the scope of this chapter to review them all. This section will outline the Avoidance Theory of Worry 
(Borkvec, 1994; Sibrava & Borkovec, 2006), and the Acceptance Model of GAD (Roemer et al., 2005) 
which builds on and extends the understanding of worry as a form of avoidance. 
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1.5.1 The Avoidance Theory of Worry 
The avoidance theory   asserts   that   ‘worry   functions   as   a   cognitive   avoidance   response,   both   to  
perceived threats in the future and to aversive images or other  internal  experiences,  like  emotions’  
(Sibrava & Borkovec, 2006, p 251). 
Worry concerns itself with the future, with possible, but currently non-existent negative events, many 
of which the individual has little or no control over. Because there is no possible behavioural response 
to avoid the threat, the only recourse is mental attempts to solve or avoid the problem. 
Sibrava and Borkovec (2006) make an important disctinction between thought and imagery. As 
discussed in a previous section (1.2.2) , imagery is closely connected with emotion, physiology and 
behaviour whereas verbal-linguistic thought is less so (Vrana et al., 1986). As worry consists of 
primarilly verbal-linguistic thought, it is theorised that, in response to perceived threat, in the 
external or internal environment (e.g. distressing images), by shifting to abstract verbal-linguistic 
thinking, somatic activation associated with anxious experiencing can be reduced. This avoidance, 
thus serves to negatively reinforce the worry process. This however, also serves to preclude 
emotional processing which leads to increased subsequent intrusions which then serve as a stimulus 
for further worry. 
Another important factor maintaining the worry process is hypothesised to be the presence of 
positive beliefs about worry. As worried about events rarely come to pass, these beliefs (i.e. that 
worry will prevent harm) reflect negatively reinforced avoidant behaviour (Sibrava & Borkovec, 
2006). 
1.5.2. An acceptance based model of GAD 
The Acceptance Model is based on the principles and theory underlying Acceptance and Commitment 
Therapy (ACT) (Hayes et al., 1999). The model builds on the concept of worry as a form of avoidance 
(Borkovec, 1994) but places it within the broader context of experiential avoidance, with worry as 
one form of such avoidance (Roemer et al., 2005). 
ACT, a contextual cognitive behaviour therapy, holds that, how people relate to their internal 
experiences (thoughts and feelings) better determines their psychological health than the form or 
content of these experiences (Bond et al., 2011).   
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Psychological inflexibility and in its converse, flexibility, are central to the Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy (ACT) model of psychological ill health. Psychological inflexibility refers to the 
extent to which psychological reactions (or private events) dominate in guiding behaviour over 
chosen values and the contingencies of the present situation. This often leads to attempts to avoid 
experiencing unwanted internal events (i.e. experiential avoidance). In contrast, psychological 
flexibility refers to the degree to which an individual is able to fully contact the present moment and 
the accompanying thoughts and feelings without unecessary defense, thus enabling them to adapt 
their behaviour in pursuit of chosen goals and values depending on what the current situation 
affords. The converse of experiential avoidance is therefore acceptance (Bond et al., 2011).  
Cognitive fusion is a component of psychological inflexibility and refers to the relationship an 
individual has with their thoughts (and other internal events). Specifically, it refers to the extent to 
which  an  individual  is  ‘fused’  to  their  thoughts  or  responds  to  them  ‘as  if’  they  were  an  external  event  
or literally true. Phrased another way, cognitive fusion is the dominance of cognitive events as a 
source of behavioural regulation, relative to other sources of behavioural regulation such as the 
immediately available contingencies between behaviour and reward (Gillanders et al., under review).  
In this model, GAD is conceptualised as a disorder characterised by experiential avoidance, explicitly 
linking the ideas of Borkovec (1994) that worry is a cognitive activity that serves an avoidant function, 
to the suggestion by Hayes et al. (1996)  that many clinical disorders may have an experientially 
avoidant function.  
Experiential avoidance refers to attempts to change or avoid difficult internal experiences (thoughts, 
feelings and physiological sensations), even though this leads to actions that are not consistent with 
an  individual’s  goals  and  values  (Bond et al., 2011). Attempts at experiential control are considered 
ultimately futile as internal experiences are not under intentional control, likewise, attempts at 
avoidance are likely to lead to paradoxical increases. Such avoidance is also likely to interfere with 
the adaptive value of emotions and lead to maladaptive behaviours (e.g. substance abuse, 
disengagement with valued experiences) (Roemer et al., 2005). 
Worry, according to the model, may be viewed as an experiential avoidance strategy reinforced by 
short term reduction in arousal but carrying with it the long term consequence of maintaining further 
experiential avoidance due to maintenance of threatening associations. It is further proposed that 
worry itself may come to be an aversive internal experience in GAD. 
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The theory builds on the work of Borkovec by placing worry as an avoidance strategy within the larger 
context of experiential avoidance.  The concept of cognitive fusion provides an explanation of why 
some individuals may come to be distressed by internal experiences or become motivated to avoid 
them even though the content or occurrence does not differ from individuals who are not motivated 
to respond in this way. Furthermore the concept of psychological flexibility, along with acceptance 
as the oppostive of experiential avoidance, opens up new possibilities for therapeutic intervention 
for problematic worry. 
 
1.5.3 Research Findings 
1.5.3.1 Worry as avoidance 
Central to the argument that worry acts as a form of cognitive avoidance is evidence that anticipatory 
worry prevents an increase in arousal in response to a stressor; and that worry leads to a decrease in 
arousal immediately following exposure to a stressor. 
A number of studies support the assertion that a period of anticipatory worry is associated with a 
smaller increase in arousal on exposure to a stressor, than is relaxation (Borkovec & Hu, 1990; Llera 
& Newman, 2010; Peasley-Miklus & Vrana, 2000). This effect is only found, however, when using the 
worry/relaxation period as a baseline, and not when using a pre-manipulation baseline (Llera & 
Newman, 2010; Peasley-Miklus & Vrana, 2000). 
Newman and Llera (2011) offer an alternative explanation for findings of reduced response to a 
stressor. They report that a period of worry (compared to relaxation or neutral condition) resulted in 
higher physiological activation and negative affect. Subsequent exposure to a fear stimulus, using 
worry as the baseline, led to less physiological and subjective responding in worry than other 
conditions. However, there were no differences between conditions in absolute levels of negative 
emotionality during the stimulus film. This is taken to suggest that rather than allowing avoidance of 
fearful emotions, the already heightened negative emotionality caused by the worry period 
prevented further increases in response to fear exposure. They propose therefore, that rather than 
an avoidance of negative emotion altogether, it is the avoidance of a negative contrast, with the 
experience  of  a  decrease  in  negative  emotions  (e.g.  relief  when  a  feared  outcome  doesn’t  occur)  that  
serves to negatively reinforce worry. This interpretation is supported by other similar findings 
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(Peasley-Miklus & Vrana, 2000; Hofmann et al., 2005) along with reports of GAD worriers and controls 
that worry ‘helps’ to prepare for bad events (Borkovec & Roemer, 1995). 
Findings on the effect of worry following exposure to a stressor are limited. Butler et al. (1995) in a 
general population sample, found that following exposure to a stressor, worry (compared to imagery) 
was associated with a decrease in anxiety but led to more subsequent intrusive images. Replication 
of the Butler et al., (1995) study is needed to replicate this finding and to extend the methodology to 
include measurement of physiological markers, to overcome the limitations involved with reliance 
solely on self-report. 
Stapinksi et al. (2010) in a sample of GAD participants, used a study design that combined response 
to a stressor and anticipation of re-exposure. Both worry and imagery were associated with higher 
anxiety ratings than relaxation following exposure to a stressor. Worry was also associated with 
increased skin conductance (indicating sympathetic arousal) following exposure and this was 
maintained at re-exposure.  Consistent  with  Llera  and  Newman’s  (2010)  contrast  avoidance  theory,  
the authors concluded that worry may produce a state of preparation for threat thus lessening 
aversiveness when negative outcomes occur. 
In the Stapinksi et al. (2010) study, there are a number of methodological differences which may 
make replication of the Butler et al. (1995) finding difficult. Firstly, the manipulation period in the 
Butler et al. (1995) study immediately followed exposure to the stressor whereas in the Stapinksi et 
al. (2010) study, a practice manipulation period using a different worry topic preceeded the main 
manipulation period which may have masked any anxiety reducing effect of the worry condition. 
Secondly, anticipation of re-exposure to the stressor may have prevented any decrease in anxiety 
due to the competing demands of recovering from exposure and anticipating further exposure. 
Thirdly, the stressor was rated as only moderately anxiety provoking in the Stapinksi et al. (2010) 
study which is supported by a lack of significant change in skin conductance or heart rate from 
baseline to exposure. There was no change in reported anxiety level from baseline to trigger for the 
worry group and small changes for imagery and relaxation. It is therefore questionnable as to 
whether the experiment is in fact measuring the response to a stressor in all groups. The lower 
anxiety ratings for relaxation therefore would appear to result from a reduction from baseline anxiety 
level for the relaxation condition. These findings are consistent with those of other studies that have 
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found that a period of repetitive thought is associated with increased anxious and depressed affect 
(e.g. McLaughlin et al., 2007) without exposure to a stressor. 
McLaughlin et al., (2007) found that worry and rumination were both associated with increased 
anxious and depressed affect and decreased positive affect from baseline both in an unselected 
sample and those high in trait worry or rumination. Furthermore, they reported that repetitive 
negative thought was capable of generating negative mood in participants not already experiencing 
chronic negative affect.  
Similarly, Stokes and Hirsch (2010), in a sample of high worriers using self-referent worry topics, 
found that anxious and depressed affect increased from baseline for both worry and imagery groups. 
Following a post-manipulation breathing phase, anxious and depressed affect decreased significantly 
in both conditions, however they decreased further following imagery, than following worry, which 
may indicate increased emotional processing in the imagery condition.    
Over an extended period of worry versus positive or neutral repetitive thought Behar et al., (2012) 
found that anxious affect decreased from the first to the third of five worry periods (22.5 minutes 
total worry period) and then increased. By contrast, repetitive thinking on a neutral topic produced 
increasing levels of anxiety over the course of the manipulation with end levels of anxiety higher in 
the neutral, than in the negative worry condition (Behar et al., 2012). This study did not include a 
baseline measure of anxious affect, however, the first period levels of anxious affect reported in the 
worry condition were higher than in the neutral condition, it can therefore be inferred that anxious 
affect increased from baseline to the first worry period before decreasing. The increase in anxious 
affect over the manipulation period for the neutral conditions was interpreted as consistent with 
findings that reptitive thought can increase anxious and depressed affect (e.g. McLaughlin et al., 
2007). There is however another possible interpretation. The neutral condition was different from 
both positive and negative conditions in that it involved world events rather than a personally 
relevant event, which may explain why thoughts samples for the neutral condition were rated as 
more abstract than other conditions. It is possible that this level of abstraction of thinking may itself 
have led to an increase in anxious affect or that abstract thinking on the designated topic became 
increasingly negative and anxiety provoking over the manipulation period. Given that participants 
were asked to consider economic consequences and cultural ramifications of a world event, it seems 
plausible  that  this  may  have  led  to  a  series  of  ‘what  if..?’  type  questions  akin to a worry process.   
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Initially it seems that studies using self-referent topics and without exposure to a stressor may be 
closer to the naturalistic worry experience in day to day life. However, this does not take account of 
the occurrence of events (external and internal) that lead to an increase in anxiety and so serve as 
triggers for worry. Exposure to an experimental stressor, either following a period of anticipation, or 
followed by a period of recovery may therefore more closely approximate the triggering of 
naturalistic worry. In studies that do not include an experimental stressor, the conjuring up of a worry 
topic in order to initiate a worry period may function as the trigger and explain the initial increase in 
anxious and depressed affect from baseline to worry. An extended period of worry following this 
initiation may therefore approximate the recovery after a stressor as seen in the Butler et al. (1995) 
study. The subsequent increase in anxious affect over an extended period of worry supports the 
findings of studies of intrusions following worry periods (e.g. Butler et al., 1995; Stokes & Hirsch, 
2010) that worry may maintain anxious meanings and interfere with emotional processing. Based on 
the findings of York et al., (1987) it may be predicted that over a longer still worry period (e.g. 30 
minutes) emotional processing may have been facilitated leading to a further decrease in anxiety. 
Another key aspect of the avoidance function of worry is the hypothesis that imagery (with its close 
links to emotion) will produce a greater increase in anxiety than will worry. Findings are inconsistent 
on this topic. Studies that have involved exposure to a stressor prior to a worry period have found, 
in line with the theory, that worry has led to lower anxiety levels than imagery (Butler et al. 1995; 
Nelson & Harvey, 2002). When asked to worry about a self-chosen worrisome topic, the expected 
difference has not emerged (Stokes & Hirsch, 2012). One possible reason for this is that mood ratings 
taken at the end of a period of imagery may actually reflect habituation to an initial increase in 
anxiety. Another explanation, as described above is that in the absence of a specific stressor or trigger 
for worry, in order to initiate a worry episode it is necessary to conjure up a worry topic (possibly by 
creating an image or verbal description of the topic), over a short manipulation period a difference 
in anxiety between conditions may therefore not be expected. A study by Behar (2005) compared 
anticipatory worry in verbal and imagery form and found that verbal worry was associated with 
higher anxiety than was imaginal worry. This is consistent with the interpretation of the findings of 
anticipatory anxiety tasks above, that anticipatory anxiety may serve to prepare an individual for a 
stressor by preventing a negative contrast, rather than by avoiding negative affect. 
Further research is needed to bring clarity to this area using frequent ratings of affect and with longer 
manipulation periods. It is also possible that intentional imagery does not provoke the same 
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emotional response as the intrusive imagery that may be involved in naturally occuring worry 
episodes, which may approximate more closely to exposure to a stressful visual stimulus such as a 
film clip or aversive imagery.  
Summary 
Apparently contradictory research evidence concerning the avoidant function of worry may, firstly,  
reflect different functions of worry in anticipation of and recovery from a stressor. Findings are 
consistent with worry serving to prepare for the occurrence of a threat and to avoid a negative 
contrast as suggested by Llera and Newman (2010). Secondly, the temporal effect of worry on 
negative affect, anxious affect in particular, may be reflected in studies finding an initial increase in 
anxious affect from baseline (e.g. Stokes & Hirsch, 2010) which may approximate exposure to a 
stressor or naturalistic worry trigger, followed by a decrease in anxious affect which may reflect 
recovery from a stressor (Butler et al. 1995; Behar et al. 2012) through avoidance of negative affect, 
followed then by an increase in anxious affect (Behar et al., 2012) which may reflect increased 
emotional processing over longer periods of worry as reported by York et al. (1987).  
This interpretation is supportive of the avoidant function of worry, with the acknowledgement that 
anticipatory worry may function as avoidance of a negative contrast rather than absolute avoidance 
of negative affect. Further research is needed to explicitly test these hypotheses and disentangle the 
findings of different research methodologies. 
There is some evidence that imagery does produce a greater anxiety response in some circumstances 
than does worry, as would be predicted by the theory. Further research is required to replicate these 
findings and clarify under what circumstances this does in fact occur. 
1.5.3.2 Worry as experiential avoidance 
Above are summarised findings that worry serves to prevent negative contrast and avoid negative 
arousal following exposure to a stressor. There is also evidence that imagery may lead to greater 
anxiety than does worry, so supporting the theoretical assertion that worriers switch to verbal-
linguistic activity to avoid affectively laden imagery. 
This section examines evidence that worriers are more inclined to use experiential avoidance more 
generally, as described in the Acceptance Model. Initial support for a model incorporating 
experiential avoidance and fear of emotion, comes from several studies finding fear of anxiety and 
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experiential avoidance to be associated with both worry and GAD severity (Roemer et al., 2005; 
Roemer et al,. 2009). Moreover, experiential avoidance was found to have a small unique relationship 
with GAD symptomatology when controlling for worry, and a separate significant relationship with 
worry (Roemer et al., 2005).  
Greater distress about emotions and greater experiential avoidance was reported for a clinical 
sample compared to a non-clinical sample, with distress about anxiety and experiential avoidance 
accouting for unique variance in intolerance of uncertainty, which has previously been found to be 
related to GAD (Gentes & Ruscio, 2011), and worry severity  (Lee et al., 2010). 
These preliminary findings are supportive of the model, however, they must be interpreted with 
some caution owing both to the reliance on self-report methodologies and the lack of control for 
comorbid disorders. Further studies exploring the relationships between worry and experiential 
avoidance and psychological flexibility would appear to be warranted to replicate and extend existing 
findings to other age and demographic groups as well as comparing clinical and non-clinical worriers. 
Studies incorporating measures of related ACT variables such as cognitive fusion may also help to 
delineate the processes involved in experiential avoidance in worriers.  
1.5.3.3 Worry and thought 
Worry is predominantly verbal as opposed to non-verbal activity, both for clinical populations of 
worriers  and  ‘normal’  worriers  (Borkovec & Inz, 1990). This predominance of verbal thought is more 
pronounced for those diagnosed with GAD, and is apparent even during periods of relaxation 
(Borkovec & Inz, 1990). Images that do occur during GAD worry periods are briefer (Hirsch et al., 
2011).  
Related to the verbal-linguistic content of worry, the worry process has been found to be more 
abstract than other types of thinking and, in an experimental situation, this has been found to be a 
function of the degree to which the topic is of concern to the individual (Stober & Borkovec, 2002). 
Behar et al. (2012) found that the thinking process becomes increasingly abstract over a period of 
repetitive thinking regardless of the valence. Counter-intuitively, neutral repetitive thought was 
found to be more abstract than either positive or negative conditions; negative thought was more 
abstract than positive thought with a medium effect size (d=.58), however this result did not reach 
significance. Examination of the prompts for each condition suggests that the topic intended to be 
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neutral, which related to world events, may itself have been more abstract than either positive or 
negative conditions which both related to the self (see discussion in section 1.5.3.1). 
There are a number of consequences hypothesised to arise from the verbal nature of worry including 
a reduction in emotional processing (Wells & Papageorgiou, 1995) and a reduction in attentional 
capacity available for other tasks which may serve to maintain the worry process (Leigh & Hirsch, 
2011). The following section will consider implications for emotional processing. 
1.5.3.4 Worry and emotional processing 
Support for the hypothesis that worry interferes with emotional processing comes from several 
strands of research. This section will consider habituation to phobic stimuli and the occurrence of 
intrusive thoughts in the context of worry. 
A presentation of a phobic stimulus usually results in a strong emotional reaction both subjectively 
and physiologically. Repeat presentations over a period of time lead to a reduction in this response, 
with degree of reduction postulated to relate to degree of emotional processing (Foa & Kozak, 1986). 
A period of worry, prior to exposure has been found to suppress the cardiovascular response to the 
phobic stimulus (Borkovec & Hu, 1990; Borkovec et al., 1993) without suppressing the subjective fear 
experience, thus preventing successful habituation of the response over repeat presentations. 
Intrusive thoughts have long been argued to result from a failure of emotional processing (Rachman,  
1980). It is suggested that individuals engage in repetitive verbal thought as a method of cognitive 
avoidance of affect laden imagery, so reducing arousal in the short term; with the consequence of 
inhibiting emotional processing, thus leading to frequent negative thought intrusions (Borkovec et 
al., 1983). The long-term failure to emotionally process material may lead to ongoing emotional and 
physiological arousal, which may in turn lead to more worry, and consequently more intrusions 
(Sibrava & Borkovec, 2006).   
Consistent with the arguement that worry blocks emotional processing are the results of several 
studies in which processing strategy was manipulated following exposure to a distressing film. Worry 
compared to imagery, resulted in more subsequent intrusive thoughts (Butler et al., 1995; Stokes & 
Hirsch, 2010).  Wells and Papageorgiou (1995) went beyond these findings and, following exposure 
to a distressing film clip, compared: worry about the stressor; unrelated worry; imagery about the 
stressor; a distractor task; and settling down as usual. It was found that the number of intrusions over 
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the following three days was highest for worry about the film, followed by unrelated worry, 
distraction, imagery and lowest for settling down as usual. The authors concluded that worry can 
both inhibit emotional processing and additionally, that the difference between number of intrusions 
following worry about the stressor and unrelated worry resulted from ‘tagging’  of threat-related 
material in memory such that the period of worry serves to increase the availability of related 
material in memory.  
A post manipulation check in the Butler et al. (1995) study, revealed that the instruction to worry 
(compared to an instruction to use imagery) led to the expected results without a difference between 
groups in the actual amount of time engaged in worry or imagery (according to self-report). This 
poses an intriguing question regarding the mechanism for the observed effects. The authors 
speculate that the manipulation served to modify attentional strategies to focus on either worry or 
imagery although both strategies were already engaged (Butler et al., 1995). Stokes and Hirsch (2010) 
excluded data from participants who did not report spending the majority of the manipulation period 
engaged in their designated form of mentation. It would be interesting therefore to compare the 
findings from the study with and without the excluded data.  
Given that different conditions in the Butler et al. (1995) study led to the expected results this may 
indicate that intentional strategies were engaged as instructed, with intrusive thoughts or images 
accounting for the time spent in the non-instructed mode. There is some support for this 
interpretation from post-manipulation data. Participants in the worry condition reported that images 
occurring during worry were spontaneous intrusions that they paid little attention to (Butler et al., 
1995). This may suggest that whilst habitual processing mode may be overcome for intentional 
thought, it may continue to dominate in the case of thought intrusions. Further research making a 
distinction in post-manipulation checks between intentional and intrusive strategies may reveal 
important information on the mechanism of such effects. Gaining information on participants 
habitual processing style may also help to disentangle the findings.   
The studies cited above have all employed short worry periods  (4 minutes, 4 minutes, and 5 minutes 
respectively) (Butler et al., 1995, Stokes & Hirsch, 2010, Hirsch & Mathews, 2012).  This is of interest 
as worry has been shown to have a curious ability to incubate or habituate negative intrusions 
depending on the amount of time spent worrying. Whilst brief periods of worry will lead to an 
increase in subsequent negative intrusive thoughts, long exposures will produce a reduction (York et 
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al., 1987). Borkovec (1994) suggests  that  this  incubation  effect  indicates  that  worrying  can  be  ‘self-
perpetuating under certain temporal conditions and suggests that whilst short periods of worry delay 
emotional processing, this may not be true for extended periods of worry. This is consistent also with 
findings of Behar et al. (2012) (described in section 1.5.3.1) that worry led to a decrease in anxiety 
followed by a subsequent increase. Given that excessive worriers report worrying for long periods of 
time, this finding is counter-intuitive. Borkovec et al. (1983) suggest that the feeling of pervasive 
worry actually reflects the frequent triggering of brief worry periods rather than continuous worry. 
This is consistent with an avoidant function of worry, with individuals using brief periods of worry to 
reduce arousal and, either switching topic, or distracting themselves with external stimuli before 
their arousal level increases.   
In summary, worry appears to reduce anxious responding to a stressor (distressing film or phobic 
stimulus) in the short-term but with the paradoxical effect of increasing intrusive thoughts in the 
longer term. This is generally accepted to result from a blocking of emotional processing due to the 
verbal nature of worry. The blocking of emotional processing may occur for short worry periods, with 
longer periods of worry leading to an increase in arousal facilitating emotional processing and a 
decrease in subsequent intrusions.  
1.5.3.5 Disengagement with values and goals 
Related to experiential avoidance is the concept of valued action and the idea that experiential 
avoidance comes at the cost of cutting an individual off from activities and actions that are valued by 
them. Michelson et al. (2011) found that treatment seeking GAD individuals reported significantly 
less valued action than controls and that this was not fully accounted for by depression comorbidity. 
Valued action was also found to contribute a unique variance to quality of life in GAD.  
These preliminary findings are supportive of the Acceptance Model of GAD, further studies may show 
whether this is specific to GAD, related to worry more generally, or a feature of psychopathology 
more generally. 
1.5.3.6 Worry and meta-cognitions 
Both positive beliefs about worry (Avoidance Theory), and worry as an aversive experience 
(Acceptance Model) are combined in the meta-cognitive model of GAD (Wells, 2006). 
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The Meta-cognitive Model proposes that individuals with GAD hold both positive and negative meta-
beliefs about worry. When faced with a problem, owing to their positive beliefs, worry is selected as 
a coping strategy. Positive beliefs therefore serve to motivate the use of worry initially, and whilst 
they are not in themselves seen as a marker of pathology, they can lead to an over-reliance on worry 
as a coping strategy (Wells, 2006). Both individuals with GAD and non-anxious controls have been 
found to hold positive beliefs about worry in relation to determining ways of avoiding or preparing 
for negative events, to superstitiously reduce their likelihood, to problem solve or motivate action. 
Only the belief that worrying helped to distract from more emotional topics that they did not want 
to think about characterised GAD participants and not controls (Borkovec & Roemer, 1995) which 
suggests an avoidant function of worry for these individuals.  
The Acceptance Model proposes that worry itself becomes an aversive experience over time. In 
Meta-Cognitive Theory it is described that over time individuals develop negative meta-cognitive 
appraisals of worry, its controllability and consequences. When these beliefs are triggered during a 
worry episode, they lead to meta-worry, or worrying about worry (also known as Type 2 worry), with 
emotional and physical symptoms increasing anxiety and the sense of threat.  
Meta-worry (the tendency to view worry itself as aversive or harmful) has indeed been found to be 
more strongly associated with pathological worry than has ordinary, worry (Wells & Carter, 1999, 
2001). Individuals with GAD have been found to endorse both positive and negative  beliefs about 
worry (Davis & Valentiner, 2000). Ruscio and Borkovec (2004) in a comparison of GAD and non-GAD 
high worriers found that positive beliefs about worry are universal, awareness of thoughts was found 
to vary with worry severity. Negative beliefs about worry were however, reported to be distinctive 
of GAD. 
In summary, positive beliefs about worry as described in the Avoidance Theory have been found to 
be universal. The belief that worrying helps to distract from more emotional topics has been reported 
to distinguish between GAD and non-GAD worriers (Borkovec & Roemer, 1995). That worry itself 
becomes an aversive experience over time is supported by research on meta-worry (or worrying 
about worry). Meta-worry has been found to be more strongly associated with pathological worry 
than worry about everyday topics (Wells & Carter, 1999, 2001). 
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1.5.3.7 Therapeutic applications 
A therapy based on the Acceptance Model, Acceptance Based Behaviour Therapy (ABBT), has 
received preliminary support in an open trial (Roemer & Orsillo, 2007), a small wait list control trial 
(Treanor et al., 2011) and a small RCT (Roemer et al., 2008) comparing ABBT to wait list control group. 
Impressive results of 78% of patients no longer meeting GAD criteria and 77% meeting criteria for 
high end-state functioning have been reported with 9 month follow up showing maintenance of gains 
or further improvement (Roemer et al., 2008). 
Treatment was found to impact GAD symptomatology and experiential avoidance as well as 
impacting on valued action (Michelson et al., 2011), fear of emotions, emotion regulation, 
intolerance of uncertainty and perceived control over anxious emotions (Treanor et al., 2011) when 
elements designed specifically to address these concepts were incorporated into treatment. These 
studies are particularly interesting  because, unlike most mainstream therapies for GAD, ABBT does 
not specifically target worry and indeed post-treatment Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) 
levels are still above the cut off used by many studies to classify problematic worry. It will be 
interesting to see from further studies therefore whether the mechanisms of change are the crucial 
distinguishing factors between high worry and GAD. 
In one study focusing on mechanism of change in ABBT, Hayes et al. (2010) found that both 
acceptance of internal experiences and engagement in meaningful activities were related to 
responder status and that change in these factors predicted outcome above and beyond change in 
worry. Change in acceptance was also related to reported quality of life at post treatment. 
Summary 
Worry functions as a form of avoidance of aversive internal or external stimuli in some circumstances 
and of negative contrast in emotional responding in others. Preliminary findings suggest that GAD is 
characterised by experiential avoidance and are in line with the hypothesis that worry may act as a 
form of experiential avoidance. Worry in general is associated with positive beliefs about worry, 
whereas GAD is associated with both positive and negative beliefs about worry, supporting the 
assertion that worry itself becomes an aversive experience. GAD is associated with disengagement 
from values and goals and has been found to respond well to an acceptance based treatment. 
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1.6 Worry across the lifespan 
There is a paucity of research into worry during childhood but from the little that has been done it is 
clear that worry is common in children and adolescents with a large percentage of children sampled 
reporting some worrying (Orton, 1982) and 15 per cent in one study reporting excessive levels of 
worry (Bell-Dolan et al., 1990). Gender differences in worry also begin in childhood with girls being 
found to worry significantly more than boys (Bell-Dolan et al., 1990). With increasing age, the variety 
of worries increases and the content of worries is found to become more abstract, increasingly 
involving psychological and social issues rather than the concrete physical concerns of younger 
children (Muris et al, 2002; Weems et al., 2000).  
This social basis of worry continues into adulthood (Lindesay et al., 2006) with social-based worries 
being the best predictor of the global tendency to worry (Ladouceur et al., 2002). Other major worry 
topics such as finances and housing, work and health vary over the lifespan (Lindesay et al., 2006), 
depending on the most salient issues for each life stage (e.g. Borkovec et al., 1983). Gender 
differences persist, with women showing a tendency to worry more than men and with women 
outnumbering men in diagnoses for GAD by approximately two to one (Wittchen et al., 1994). One 
study has suggested that this may be accounted for by the greater tendency of women to report the 
use of thought suppression and negative problem orientation (Robichaud et al., 2003).  
Gender differences are found, not only for GAD, but also depression. Unlike worry, differences in 
depression emerge only in adolescence (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2001). The gender difference is partly 
accounted for by the tendency to ruminate which has been found to prolong and intensify dysphoric 
mood episodes and increase the risk of developing depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1999). This may be 
taken to suggest that the processes underlying depression and GAD, rumination and worry, may be 
used as coping methods from childhood or early adolescence for girls moreso than boys and reflect 
a tendency toward inward-focused rather than action-based coping (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2001). 
There is broad agreement that older adults, in general, report fewer worries overall, with around 15 
per cent describing themselves as worriers (Powers et al., 1992; Wisocki, 1994). It has been found 
that those who are ill or housebound worry more than their healthy and active counterparts (Wisocki, 
1994) and there is some evidence that worry may increase among the oldest old (Neikrug, 2003). 
However, the overall prevalence rate for GAD is lower in those over 65 than for younger age groups 
(Blazer et al, 1991).  
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It has been reasoned that differences in worry rates among older adults may be due to a number of 
factors including: survival biases; cohort differences; the development of wisdom; and changes in 
coping strategies (Wetherell, 2006). Whilst we know that levels of worry are lower among older 
adults in generaI, it is not clear how this translates to an individual basis, whether individuals are 
worrying less as they age (due to factors such as change in coping strategies) or whether those who 
worry excessively are less likely to reach old age (survival biases). In one focus group study, the 
majority of older adult worriers felt that worry had intensified over their lifespan rather than 
decreasing (Wisocki et al., 1998). This finding would tend to support the latter hypothesis, that those 
who worry excessively are less likely to reach old age. In reality there is likely to be multiple reasons 
for the reduction of worry in older age and indeed there is also some evidence that the use of coping 
strategies does change with age. One study reported that younger adults use a greater number of 
different coping strategies than do older adults, with older adults most commonly endorsing keeping 
busy and maintaining a positive attitude. This suggests, either that older adults have less need to 
employ coping strategies, or that, over time, they have tended to select the coping strategies that 
are perceived to work for them (Hunt et al., 2003). 
Whilst some studies report that health is the most prominent worry topic among older people (e.g. 
Wisocki et al., 1986) other studies have highlighted issues related to aging as the main area of concern 
(Ladouceur et al. 2002). Whilst there is general agreement that social concerns are lower than for 
other age groups, a strong correlation between social concerns and tendency to worry remains 
(Ladouceur et al. 2002). Differences in findings between studies may reflect methodological 
differences or cohort differences, due to the differing age ranges used by different studies, spanning 
several different cohorts. As in other age groups, differences in worry content have not been found 
to distinguish between GAD and non-GAD groups (Diefenbach et al., 2001).  
In summary, worry is a common phemomenon across the lifespan, and is problematic for some 
individuals from childhood, through adulthood and old age. Pathological worry, in the context of 
anxiety disorders is a long term problem with only 3 per cent reporting onset of anxiety symptoms in 
old age and with average duration of anxiety disorders increasing with age (Blazer et al., 1991). There 
is also anecdotal evidence to suggest that for individuals who experience high worry, worry intensifies 
with age (Wisocki et al., 1998). Within the general population however, less worry is reported by 
older adults (Wisocki, 1994). 
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In the context of the present study, it is relevant that anecdotally, at least, worriers report that worry 
intensifies over their life span which is consistent with the assertion that, due to repeated use of 
processing  habits  worry  can  ‘grow’  over  time  (Hirsch & Mathews, 2012). The finding that older adults 
tend to use a smaller number of coping strategies than younger adults (Hunt et al., 2003) is also 
consistent with a picture of a consolidation of ways of processing information and coping with 
stressors over the course of a lifetime.  
 
1.7 The present study 
Thinking can occur in both verbal and non-verbal modes and the extent to which an individual uses 
one or the other depends partly on the task at hand and partly on preference for processing style 
(Paivio, 1991). Little is known about what influences preference for processing style or how this may 
relate to psychopathology. Worry is accepted to be a predominantly verbal-linguistic process and it 
is theorised that it may function as a form of cognitive or experiential avoidance of internal 
experiences including intrusive images and the associated emotions (Borkovec, 1994; Roemer et al., 
2005). It is not currently known whether this may be influenced by, or influence an individual’s  
preferred processing style. 
Intrusive thoughts are a normal experience, the impact of which depends on the way an individual 
appraises and responds to these experiences (e.g. Rassin et al., 1999; Salkovskis et al., 1995). Little is 
currently known about the experience of intrusive thoughts, memories and images across the 
spectrum of worry, across the lifespan, or other factors that may influence whether worry is used in 
an attempt to avoid intrusions. Intrusive thoughts are known to occur in excessive worry which is 
hypothesised to occur due to the effect of worry on emotional processing (e.g. Butler et al., 1995). 
Little is known however about the way in which intrusive thoughts and images differ in respect to 
their relationship with the tendency to worry. 
Both worry and intrusions are known to occur from childhood onwards. It is argued that through 
repeated use of processing habits and coping styles, these tendencies and styles of thinking will be 
consolidated over time. It is therefore expected that an older adult population would provide an 
opportunity to  study  ‘well  rehearsed’ individual styles of processing information and responding to 




In order to better understand processes  that  contribute  to  an   individual’s  tendency to worry, the 
current project will explore how the presence and nature of intrusive experiences (memories, images 
and thoughts) may relate to individuals tendency to worry across the spectrum of worry severity. 
Psychological inflexibility and cognitive fusion will be measured to determine the contribution of 
these factors to worry tendency and the experience of intrusions. 
Given the chronicity of the tendency to worry, it is likely that an older adults sample will have a long 
duration of their level of worry.  It has been shown that people use fewer coping strategies in old age 
(Hunt et al., 2003); and has been proposed that processing habits, and so the tendency to worry, can 
‘grow’  over  time  (Hirsch & Mathews, 2012). It is therefore predicted that links between these factors 




1) The presence and severity of intrusive memories and images will decrease as worry scores 
increase. 
2) The presence and severity of intrusive thoughts will increase as worry scores increase 
3) Cognitive fusion, psychological inflexibility and worry together will better predict the 
likelihood of reporting intrusions than worry alone. 
4) The relationship between level of worry and intrusion severity will be accounted for by 







The study adopted a cross sectional design, with levels of trait worry, cognitive fusion and 
psychological inflexibility as predictor variables and the experience of intrusions (presence and 
severity) as outcome variables.  
2.2 Power calculation and sample size 
The study will explore the relationship between level of trait worry, cognitive fusion and 
psychological inflexibility and the experience of intrusions. As this is exploratory in nature, there are 
no studies available for direct comparison.  
There are established links between some of the study variables. Previous research links worry with 
experiential avoidance (a component of psychological inflexibility) for which large effect sizes have 
been reported (r=.57) (Roemer et al., 2005). Worry has been demonstrated to result in increased 
intrusive thoughts following exposure to a stressor (F=.4, large effect size) (Stokes & Hirsch, 2010). 
Experimental induction of thought action fusion, related to beliefs about intrusion, has also been 
shown to result in an increase in subsequent intrusive thoughts (t-2.8, r=.6, large effect size). By 
contrast, a period of worry is linked to reduced imagery compared to a period of positive thinking, 
and is reduced still further in GAD patients compared to controls (F2=.59, large effect size) (Hirsch et 
al., 2011).  
To summarise, previous research demonstrates large effect sizes for relationships between: worry 
and experiential avoidance; worry and intrusive thoughts; thought-action fusion and intrusive 
thoughts; and worry and reduced imagery. In light of these established links, it seems reasonable to 
predict medium to large effect sizes in the current study. 
According to Cohen (1992) for an alpha level of .05 and power of .8, a sample size of 26 is needed to 
detect a large effect size, whilst a sample of 85 is needed to detect a medium effect size, in a 




2.3 Participants  
A total of 62 participants were recruited. Participants were recruited through both community groups 
and organisations and clinical settings (mental health services). This was intended to provide greater 
representation of the full spectrum of worry rather than focusing solely on high or low worrying 
groups.    
The term older adults covers a broad range of ages and several generations, in order to increase the 
representativeness of the sample, a wide variety of community groups and organisations were 
contacted, catering for different adult age groups.  
Inclusion and exclusion criteria were developed in order to maximise the representativeness of the 
sample whilst safeguarding patients who may become distressed by the study process, not be able 
to provide full informed consent, of whose needs could not adequately be met by the restrictions on 
the study process (e.g. the need for translators). 
Inclusion criteria 
x The participant must be residing in a community setting either in their own private home or 
warden controlled accommodation. 
x The participant must be aged 60 or older to be classified for study purposes as an older adult. 
x The participant must be fluent in spoken and written English in order to cope with the 
demands of the study. 
Exclusion criteria 
x The participant self-reports cognitive impairment, to the extent that day to day functioning is 
impaired. 
x The participant currently misuses drugs or alcohol. 
x The participant has experienced a recent bereavement or trauma (past year). 
x The participant reports current suicidal ideation. 
x The participant meets criteria for a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder. 
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Difficulties with memory or thinking were discussed during the informed consent process to 
determine their extent and impact on functioning. The other exclusion criteria were determined as 
part of the Structured Clinical Interview. 
Individual’s  participation  in  the  study  was  entirely  on  a  voluntary  basis,  no  fee  or  reward  was  offered  
for taking part.  
2.4 Recruitment strategy 
Participants were recruited through opportunity and snowballing sampling, as outlined below. As the 
intention was to recruit participants across the spectrum of worry recruitment was carried out across 
both community and clinical settings. 
Community settings 
Participants were recruited predominantly through community centres, groups and organisations, 
although friends and family were also asked to pass details of the study to anyone over 60 they may 
know who may be interested in taking part. 
Area managers of community services for older people within the target area were contacted and 
they agreed to pass on information about the study to individual centres. This was followed up by 
contacting individual centres, and, where appropriate dropping into groups and activities for the 
target age group. This ensured that information was communicated directly to service users. 
When visiting community groups the chief investigator spoke to the group as a whole to briefly 
introduce the study and was then available, along with an assistant  to  answer  individuals’  questions  
or provide more detailed information for those interested in taking part. 
Recruitment was widened to include two further geographical areas and contact was made with 
community and resource centres for older people as well as organisations likely to include members 
of the target age range such as adult learning centres, Rotary   Club   and  Women’s   Institute.   The  
researcher met with groups in person, though for some groups, introduction to the study was via 
electronic communications.  
Clinical settings 
The chief investigator met with the Care of the Elderly multidisciplinary team and it was agreed that 
professionals within services in two local hospitals would identify patients on their caseload who may 
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meet diagnostic criteria for Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD). Clinicians were asked to provide the 
participant information sheet and to invite appropriate patients to contact the chief investigator if 
they were interested in taking part or wished to find out more about the study.  
More detailed information and reminders were then sent via email to representatives of the different 
professional groups in attendance at the meeting, including Psychiatry, Occupational Therapy and 
Nursing.   In   addition   a   separate   email   was   sent   to   colleagues   working   within   the   Older   People’s  
Psychology Services, with regular reminders and updates. 
Due to low numbers of patients identified as meeting the study criteria the decision was taken to 
expand recruitment in the following ways: it was decided to provide more regular updates and 
reminders to staff, in person where possible, with details of numbers recruited to date and numbers 
still to recruit; a leaflet was developed to provide a more accessible initial introduction to the study; 
the inclusion criteria was expanded, with clinicians asked to provide information on the study to all 
patients presenting with clinical levels of anxiety rather than solely those likely to meet criteria for 
GAD. This decision was taken, as diagnostic uncertainty seemed to be leading to reluctance amongst 
clinicians to pass on details of the study for fear of being over-inclusive. The decision was also taken 
to expand recruitment to other areas in Scotland. Psychology departments in a further three health 
boards were contacted to assess their willingness to become involved in recruitment. 
Due to service demands and populations served it was possible to expand recruitment to only one 
further health board. Contact was made with the Clinical Psychology service for older people within 
the new health board. It was agreed that recruitment would initially involve only one area team. As 
this strategy did not result in sufficient numbers of patients meeting the study criteria receiving the 
study leaflet, recruitment was expanded to include all area teams as well as colleagues in nursing and 
psychiatry.   
 
2.5 Measures 
2.5.1 Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV: Screening questionnaire, Anxiety Module, 
Depression Module 
The Structured Clinical Interview (SCID-I) for DSM-IV is a semi-structured interview for determining 
whether an individual meets criteria for the major Axis 1 disorders according to the Diagnostic and 
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Statistical Manual-version four (DSM-IV). It is designed to be administered by a trained researcher or 
mental health professional (First et al., 2002) 
The SCID is comprised of separate modules for each class of diagnosis and it is recommended that 
interviewers should not administer a SCID which contains diagnoses they will not be assessing 
(www.scid.org/info/guideline.html, n.d.; retrieved Oct, 2012). This allows for the elimination of 
whole modules that are not relevant to the study being conducted, or the elimination of questions 
pertaining to subtypes if these are not needed. This results in a briefer version specific to the study 
being undertaken, thus minimising researcher and participant time.  
For the current study, the decision was taken to include the screening questions along with the 
anxiety and depression modules. 
Reliability and Validity 
There is a difficulty in determining the validity of the  SCID  which  lies  in  the  lack  of  an  alternative  ‘gold  
standard’   interview   or   instrument   for   comparison.   Thus   the   SCID   is   currently   compared   to   ‘best  
estimate  diagnosis’  using  the  ‘LEAD’  standard,  that  is  made  based  on  a  longitudinal  assessment  (L),  
done by expert diagnosticians (E), using all data (AD). The time and labour intensive nature of 
completing this type of assessment means its practical use is limited. However approximations of the 
procedure have been used in several studies and have demonstrated superior validity of the SCID 
over the standard clinical interviews at intake episode (e.g. Basco et al., 2000, Fenning et al., 1994, 
Kranzler et al., 1996). 
Studies of the reliability of SCID diagnoses have reported wide ranging results due to the many factors 
that influence the reliability of this type of instrument, including the design (joint interview or 
test/retest), the population sampled, and the training of the interviewer. Of relevance to this study 
are the values reported for major depressive disorder (MDD) kappa=.66, (Lobbestael et al., 2010) 
kappa =.61, .81 (Zanarini et al., 2000)) and generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) kappa=.75 (Lobbestael 
et al., 2010), kappa =.44, .63 (Zanarini et al., 2000)). Kappa is a statistic that corrects for chance 
agreement with values above .75 considered good, from .41 to .75 fair to good, and below .41 poor 
(Fleiss et al., 2003). Agreement on diagnoses for MDD and GAD in the reported studies is therefore 
considered either fair to good or good. 
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The SCID for DSM-IV is currently used as the gold standard for research (e.g., Sheer et al., 2000, 
Steiner et al., 1995) in determining whether participants meet diagnostic criteria for the disorder/s 
in question. Self-report measures such as the Penn State Worry Questionnaire and the Geriatric 
Depression Questionnaire have been shown to discriminate well between clinical and non-clinical 
populations (see later descriptions), though were not developed as diagnostic measures. The decision 
was therefore made to use the SCID-I to explore the presence of anxiety and mood diagnoses in this 
sample. 
2.5.2 Intrusions interview 
The intrusions interview is a structured interview developed by Trishna Patel and colleagues for a 
study of imagery in major depression (Patel et al., 2007). The interview consists of three sub-sections 
relating to memories, images and thoughts. In the first section (pertaining to memories) participants 
were  asked  to  report  ‘any  spontaneous  autobiographical  memories  that  kept  coming  to  mind  over  
the past week  from  a  past  event’  (Patel  et al., 2007). If the last week was not typical they were asked 
about a typical week. If participants did not report intrusive memories they were asked to think back 
to a time when they had felt most depressed, and to report on their recollection of intrusive 
memories during that week. In a variation from the original methodology of Patel et al. (2007), if 
participants in the current study did not report any memories they were asked to think back to when 
they felt most worried or anxious (rather than depressed) and whether they experienced any 
intrusive memories at that time.  
The total number of intrusive memories was recorded for each participant with the two most 
frequent and distressing being explored further in the interview. Participants are asked when the 
episode in the memory occurred and their age at the time as well as to briefly describe the content. 
Participants were asked to rate on visual analogue scales from 0 to 100 the vividness of each memory; 
the extent to which different emotions accompanied the memory (such as anger, guilt, anxiety, 
helplessness);  the  ‘sense  of  ‘nowness’  and  re-experiencing of emotions and physical sensations that 
were present in the original event; and the average amount of time the intrusion usually lasts 
(seconds, minutes, hours).  In the event that participants reported more than two emotions, they 
were asked which they considered to be the two predominant emotions linked to the intrusion in 
cases where this was not clear from intensity ratings.  
44 
 
Participants were asked to rate each memory (also on a 0-100 scale) on a further four dimensions, 
frequency, distress, uncontrollability and interference with daily activities. In a later study, these four 
questions were found to have internal consistency alpha levels ranging from .90 to .95 (Brewin et al., 
2009). These ratings were summed to provide a composite severity score, as described by Brewin et 
al. (2009).   
The same questions were repeated for intrusive images and intrusive thoughts (for thoughts 
participants were asked to rate the degree to which the thought was the same each time, in place of 
rating vividness, and the degree of reliving was not inquired about). If a participant reported that 
they did not experience the phenomena that was being asked about, after clarifying understanding 
of the definition of the phenomena, the remaining questions from the sub-section were discontinued 
and instead the interviewer moved on to the next sub-section. 
These sections were administered in a fixed order, however, if a participant reported an experience 
relating to a different sub-section to the one that was being administered, their complete response 
was recorded in the appropriate section before returning to the previous point in the interview 
schedule. 
Following initial interviews it was decided to make minor alterations to the wording of the first 
imagery question, to maximise reporting of intrusive images and to add in two further questions. As 
the interview did not provide any information on  the  participants’  habitual  mode  of  processing,  and  
it was not considered justifiable to include an additional measure, it was decided to include one 
question from the Verbalizer-Visualizer Questionnaire (VVQ) (Richardson, 1977). Participants were 
therefore  asked  ‘are  you  aware  that your  thinking  often  consisting  of  mental  pictures  or  images?’,  if  
they responded in the negative then this was clarified  by  asking  ‘are  you  aware  that your thinking 
ever consists of  mental  pictures  or   images?’. Changes were approved by LREC and local NHS R&D 
departments.  
Use 
The original study for which the interview was developed involved a UK sample of 66 adults between 
the ages of 24 and 61 years who had been referred for a study of the cognitive treatment of 
depression (Patel et al., 2007). A later treatment outcome study involving ten patients between 30 
and 56 years old also used the intrusions interview as a baseline and follow up assessment tool 
(Brewin et al., 2009). 
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 To the author’s knowledge, this interview has not before been used with older adults. There is 
however, no content or wording expected to be problematic for older adults.  
Alternatives 
Due   to   the  exploratory  nature  of   this   study  and   the  need   to   compare  participants’  experience of 
intrusive memories and images, there was no known alternative to the intrusions interview. 
The possibility of developing an interview schedule specifically for the current study was considered. 
However using an existing measure was deemed preferable as the intrusions interview was expected 
to provide sufficient data to investigate the study hypotheses and would also have the advantage of 
allowing comparison with existing published research on a different patient population. 
2.5.3 Penn-state worry questionnaire 
This is a 16 item self-report questionnaire measuring trait worry (Meyer et al., 1990) developed in 
the US. Respondents are required to indicate on a five point scale how typical or characteristic 
statements are of them. 
Reliability and validity 
The measure was originally developed in 1990 due to the identified lack of an instrument to measure 
trait worry, and it is in wide use today. The original paper reporting the development and validation 
of the measure reported a series of studies using US samples of college students. The authors 
reported good internal consistency across three separate samples with over 750 participants (mean 
α=0.94). Females scored significantly higher than males across the first two samples (p<0.002, p<0.01 
respectively). The authors reported test-retest reliability over two weeks (n=56, r=0.75), four weeks 
(n=52, r=0.74) and eight to ten weeks (n=45, r=0.92). Cohen (1992) summarises effect sizes for r as: 
small for r=>10, mediums for r=>30 and large for r=>50. By these criteria, there is a large effect size 
for the test-retest reliability of this measure. 
The measure was found to correlate more strongly with the trait section of the State Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (n=389, r=0.64, large effect size) than with the state section of the same measure (n=395, 
r=0.49, medium effect size) or the Beck Depression Inventory (n=154, r=0.36, medium effect size). 
The measure was found not to be significantly influenced by social desirability as measured by the 
Marlowe=Crown Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964) (n= 163, r= -0.09). 
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The scale was found to be capable of discriminating between those meeting full, partial and no 
criteria for GAD (n=392) using Scheffe post hoc analysis. Those meeting criteria for GAD also scored 
significantly higher than participants meeting criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder (p<0.02), 
indicating that the measure is able to discriminate between healthy and anxious populations as well 
as between two different anxiety disorders (Meyer et al., 1990).  
The measure has also been used widely with older adult populations and the psychometric properties 
for this group have been investigated.  
An initial investigation of the psychometric properties of the measure was carried out with a US 
sample of older adults 47 of whom met criteria for GAD and 94 controls, aged 55-82. The study 
revealed  good  internal  consistency  (α  =.80  to  .89)  and  significant  correlations  with  other  measures  
including the Worry Scale (r=.43) and the state (r=.40) and trait (r=.58) subscales of the State Trait 
Anxiety Inventory. The overall psychometric properties were concluded to be adequate for use in 
older adult populations (Beck et al., 1996). 
A later replication and expansion of the earlier study was conducted using a sample of 57 older adults 
between the ages of 60 and 80, who met criteria for GAD diagnosis according to DSM-IV criteria. The 
authors  reported  similar  findings  with  respect  to  internal  consistency  (α=.83)  and  interrelations  with 
other worry and anxiety measures (r=.45-.55). In this study the measure was also found to have good 
divergent validity, with only weak correlations with the Beck Depression Inventory (r=.16) and the 
Geriatric Depression Scale(r=.24).  It was also found to be unrelated to demographic variables, unlike 
content related measures (Stanley et al, 2001).  
Older adults have been found to report significantly lower scores than their younger counterparts 
and this difference holds across both unselected community dwelling older adults and patients with 
GAD (Hopko et al., 2003). A cut off has been suggested of 50 for the 16 item version and 22 for the 
abbreviated version for optimal prediction of GAD diagnosis (Stanley et al., 2001). 
Versions and use 
The PSWQ is one of the most widely used measures to assess level of worry for both clinical and 
research purposes. The ease of use of the PSWQ has been questioned, particularly for older adults. 
It has been suggested, based on indications in two treatment outcome studies, (Stanley et al., 2001; 
Wetherell et al., 2003) that older adults may have difficulty in interpreting the meaning of the 
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reversed items, thus leading to questionable reliability of responses to these items. In response to 
these concerns, a shortened eight item version has been developed which is reported to correlate 
strongly with the full-length version (r=.92) and to have similar psychometric properties (internal 
consistency.α=.87,   test-retest reliability r=.63) (Hopko et al., 2003). Whilst these results are 
promising, this preliminary study was carried out with a relatively homogeneous sample, the majority 
of whom were female, aged 65-70 years and high functioning. The authors therefore suggest that 
further validation of the eight item version is needed, particularly with respect to its generalisability 
to more diverse population. It was therefore decided to use the 16 item version for the purposes of 
this study.  
Alternatives 
A self-report scale capable of measuring trait worry in an older population was sought, and the 
following alternatives were considered along with the PSWQ: 
The Worry Scale was developed specifically for older adult populations (Wisocki et al., 1986). It is a 
35 item self-report questionnaire and assesses worry over three different domains. As it is longer 
than the PSWQ and not specifically a measure of trait worry it was deemed unsuitable for inclusion 
in the study.  
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory can provide separate scores for state and trait anxiety, and has 
been found to correlate well with the PSWQ, particularly the trait score (Meyer et al., 1990). The 
measure is however, subject to copy right restrictions and therefore not freely available for use. 
The PSWQ is a measure of trait worry with adequate psychometrics for use in an older adult 
population. It is a relatively short measure which is similar in format to two other measures being 
included in the study. The PSWQ is also widely used in both research and clinical practice which allows 
for comparison of the study sample with samples used in other research. The scale is also not 
restricted by copyright, is freely available and simple to score. 
2.5.4 Geriatric Depression Scale  
This self-report questionnaire was developed specifically as a screening tool for depression in older 
adults (Yesavage et al., 1983). Respondents mark either yes or no to indicate whether statements 
have applied to them in the past week. The original scale comprised of 30 items, however a shorter 
15 item version is in wide use today and even shorter 10, 5 and 4 item versions have been developed. 
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The 30, 15 and 5 item versions will be discussed below. The scale was originally developed in the US 
but has since been translated into many different languages and is widely used around the world for 
clinical and research purposes. 
Reliability and Validity 
For the original validation study, for the 30 item measure, the scale was completed by 60 older people 
under treatment for depression and 40 community dwelling controls. The GDS was found to have 
good internal consistency (α   .94), and good test-retest reliability (r=.85, p<0.001). The scale was 
found to be significantly correlated with other validated measures of depression: the Hamilton Rating 
Scale for Depression (Hamilton, 1960) (r=.80, p<0.001); and the Zung Self-rating Depression Scale 
(Zung, 1965)(r=.84, p<0.001). The scale was also found to be able to effectively discriminate between 
classifications of severity of depression determined by correlation with the Research Diagnostic 
Criteria (RDC) for major affective disorder (Spitzer et al., 1978) (r=.82, p<0.001) (Yesavage et al., 
1983).  
A briefer 15 item version was developed for situations where time was a consideration (Sheikh & 
Yesavage, 1986). In the original validation study for the GDS-15, the sensitivity to accurately detect 
cases of depression was reported at 92% and specificity, that is the ability to correctly classify non-
depressed  respondent’s,  at  89%.  The  shorter  version   is highly correlated (r=.84, p<0.001) with the 
original, longer form (Sheikh & Yesavage, 1986). 
In a recent meta-analysis comparing the 30 and 15 item versions, Mitchell et al. (2010) analysed a 
total of 17 studies in primary care. The GDS-30 (7 studies) was found to have a sensitivity level of 
77.4% and specificity of 65.4%. Whilst the GDS-15 had a sensitivity level of 81.3% and specificity of 
78.4%.  The fraction of cases of depression correctly identified by the GDS-15 was found to be 
significantly higher than the 30 item version (p<0.0001).  Based on their analyses, the authors 
recommended the GDS-15 item, but not the 30 item for screening late-life depression in primary care 
(Mitchell et al., 2010). 
The GDS-15 has also found to be of use in many other settings including inpatient (Lester & Berryhill, 
1994) and care homes (Marc et al., 2008) where it was found that diagnostic accuracy was not 
influenced by the severity of clinical or functional factors or sociodemographics. It was therefore 
suggested that the GDS-15 is a useful measure for screening diverse older adult populations. 
49 
 
The five item version (GDS-5) was developed from the 15 item version by selecting the five items 
most highly correlated with a clinical diagnosis of depression. In a sample of 74 frail, community 
dwelling older people, the GDS-5 was found to have a sensitivity of 97% (compared to 94% for the 
GDS-15) and a specificity of 85% (compared to 82% for the GDS-15). There was significant agreement 
found between depression diagnosis and scores on the GDS-5 (kappa = 0.81) (Hoyl et al., 1999).  
In order to minimise the time burden, and potential fatigue of study participants, the 15 item version 
was considered to offer the best compromise of time efficiency whilst still providing a measure of the 
severity of the depression or sub-threshold symptoms, which shorter versions, whilst useful for 
screening purposes, are not able to do (Almeida & Almeida, 1999). 
Alternatives 
Other self-report measures in popular use with older adults include the Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) and the Beck Depression Inventory –II (Beck et al. 1996). 
These scales where therefore considered along with the Geriatric Depression Scale for inclusion in 
the study both to provide a screen of, and a measure of severity of, symptoms of depression. 
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) was developed 
specifically for use in populations with physical ill health. The likelihood of living with a long term 
condition increases with increasing age the inclusion of somatic symptoms of depression has been 
found to be problematic in older adult populations (Yesavage et al., 1983). It was therefore 
considered preferable to use a measure that did not heavily rely on somatic symptoms, which 
indicated the HADS as worthy of further consideration particularly as the HADS is widely used as a 
screening measure. In a clinical population of older adults, although strong correlations were found 
with other measures at initial assessment (r=.51-.54) and again at final assessment (r=.73-.79), they 
were not as high as has been found with other measures, this was particularly the case with initial 
assessments. The authors concluded that while the HADS may be a useful adjunct to other scales, the 
correlations were not of a magnitude to justify using the HADS as an alternative to other measures 
(Flint & Rifat, 1996). 
The Beck Depression Inventory, second edition (BDI-II) (Beck et al., 1996), was developed for use with 
ages 13 years and up. Whilst there was concern about the use of the original BDI (BDI-I) with older 
people due to the number of somatic symptoms included (Segal et al., 2008), the BDI-II was 
developed with older, as well as younger adults, in mind and older adults were included in the original 
50 
 
study of the psychometrics of the scale (Beck et al., 1996). With a sample of 376 community dwelling 
adults (n=229 age 17-29, n=147, age 55-90) good  internal  consistency  was  found  for  both  younger  (α 
.92) and older  adults  (α  .86). There was no significant difference in mean score between the younger 
and older age groups (M=9.21, M= 7.63 respectively, p>.05) (Segal et al., 2008). 
However,  this  author’s  experience  of  using  this  measure  in  clinical  practice  echoes  the  concerns  of  
Yesavage et al.(1983) that a more complex response format (in this case a forced choice between 
different categories of severity) and the inclusion of somatic symptoms (such as energy level) may 
cause difficulties in some older adults. There was a concern this could potentially lead to missing data 
if participants left out items they considered as not relevant to themselves, such as items relating to 
a decline in sexual function, which is common in non-depressed older adults (Yesavage et al., 1983), 
or were unable to choose between responses, as may be anticipated in highly anxious participants. 
Use of the BDI-II is also restricted under copyright which made this a less favourable measure for 
inclusion in the study.  
The Geriatric Depression Scale – 15 item (GDS-15) was considered as most closely meeting the needs 
of the study for a self-report measure allowing both screening for, and providing an indication of 
symptom severity of, depression in a community dwelling older adult sample. As the scale was 
specifically designed for use with older adults, it does not rely on somatic symptoms and is therefore 
not   confounded   by   respondent’s   physical   ill   health.   The   scale  was   also   developed  with   a   simple  
yes/no response format making it very easy to complete, it was hoped this would minimise missing 
data  through  difficulties  in  finding  the  ‘right’  response  category.   
2.5.5 Acceptance and Action Questionnaire version two (AAQ-II) 
The Acceptance and Action Questionnaire version two (AAQ-II) was developed as a short, seven item, 
self-report measure of psychological inflexibility and experiential avoidance (from now on referred 
to only as psychological inflexibility) as central to the Acceptance and Commitment Therapy model 
(ACT model) (Hayes et al., 2004).  
The scale has seven items and respondents are asked to indicate on a seven point scale (from never 
true to always true) the degree to which statements are true for them. Higher total scores indicate 
greater psychological inflexibility. 
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The AAQ-II measures the same concept as the AAQ-I (r=.97) but has improved on the psychometric 
problems of the first version.  The  measure  has  good  internal  consistency  (mean  α  .84),  and  good  
test-retest reliability has been reported at both 3 months and 12 months (r=.81 and .79 respectively) 
(Bond et al., 2011). 
The AAQ-II is significantly correlated with scales measuring related concepts such as The White Bear 
Suppression Inventory (WBSI) (Muris et al., 1996) (r=.59-.63), the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; 
Beck et al., 1996) (r =.70, .71) and the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck et al., 1988) (r= .61) but the 
strength of association is not so high as to suggest they are measuring the same constructs. Hayes et 
al., (2004) noted that these correlations were as would be expected given that the AAQ-II cuts across 
several specific strategies and response domains to measure a more broad-based psychological 
phenomenon (Hayes et al., 2004). The measure was found not to be significantly influenced by social 
desirability as measured by the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSD) (Crowne & 
Marlowe, 1964) (r=-.09). Of relevance to the current study is that, although no psychometric data has 
been reported for older adults, no effect of age on mean score has been found within samples 
including participants under 21(n=35) and  51 and over (n=21) (Bond et al., 2011). 
Alternatives 
A measure was sought that looked at how participants related to their own internal experiences. 
Alternatives include the Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ) (Wells & Davies, 1994) and the White 
Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI) (Muris et al., 1996). As these relate specifically to thought control 
strategies and the use of thought suppression, respectively, these, and similar measures were 
considered too specific for the present study. Instead, a measure was sought that provided 
information on how an individual relates to a broader category of internal experience, including, but 
not limited to, thoughts. For this reason the AAQ-II was identified as a short, easy to complete 
measure  that  could  provide  information  about  an  individual’s  relationships  to  their  own  thoughts,  
emotions and other internal experiences in one measure. The authors of the AAQ-II have also given 
permission for the copying and use of the AAQ-II for research and clinical purposes. 
2.5.6 Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire (CFQ) 
The Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire is a recently developed short self-report measure. Cognitive 
fusion   is  defined  as   ‘the   tendency   for  behavior   to  be  overly   regulated  or   influenced  by cognition, 
compared   to   other   sources   of   behavioural   regulation,   such   as   contact  with   direct   contingencies’  
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(Gillanders et al., under review). Cognitive fusion includes believability of thoughts, dominance of 
cognitive  events  within  a  person’s  awareness,  taking thoughts and beliefs literally and responding to 
cognitive events as if they were an external reality. 
The scale has seven items and asks the respondent to rate on a seven point scale (from never true to 
always true) the degree to which each statement is true for them. Both the layout of the scale and 
the response format is the same as the AAQ-II.  
Psychometric data has been reported for a number of separate samples totaling over 1800 
participants.   The   authors   report   good   internal   consistency   (mean   α=.89)   and   good   test-retest 
reliability over a one month period (r=.81, p<0.001). One of the samples tested (Dementia care givers) 
included older adults with a mean sample age of 68.6 years (sd: 11.5) and a range of 31-95 years 
(Gillanders et al., under review).   
The CFQ is reported to correlate highly, and the direction that would be predicted by ACT theory, 
with measures of related constructs including The Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ-II; 
Bond et al., 2011) (r =.72-.87, p<0.001), The Automatic Thought Questionnaire (Hollon & Kendall, 
1980) (r=.61, p<0.001) and Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996) (r = .69, p<0.001). 
The CFQ is not significantly associated with a measure of social desirability (BIDR-IM; Paulhus, 1991) 
(r=-.19) (Gillanders et al., under review). 
The CFQ was developed due to the lack of an available alternative, which also meant there were not 
alternative measures available for consideration for inclusion in this study. This use of the same 
layout and response format as another measure to be used in the study was considered an 
advantage. 
2.6 Ethical Issues 
2.6.1 Ethic Approval 
Approval was granted by the University of Edinburgh. As the current study involves NHS patients 
and recruitment through NHS services, ethical approval was also required from the local research 
and ethics committee and research and development departments for each hospital site involved. 
In the initial recruitment phase, ethical approval was granted by the local research ethics 
committee as well as the research and development department for one hospital site. Due to 
expansion of the recruitment and minor changes to the materials used, approval was sought, and 
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granted, through the local research and ethics committee for an amendment to the study. Research 
and development approval was granted for the original hospital site and an additional site in 
another NHS trust (see appendix 3). 
2.6.2 Informed consent 
All participants had a minimum of 24 hours between learning of the study and providing informed 
consent. The chief investigator, where necessary, read through the participant information sheet 
with potential participants and provided an opportunity to ask questions. Potential participants 
were able to take as long as they wished to consider taking part, and were encouraged to discuss 
participation with others if they wished. Those who agreed to take part were then asked to read 
through and sign the consent form and were advised that they could withdraw their consent at any 
time, without giving a reason.  
2.6.3 Potential risks to participants 
It was recognised that some participants who experience distressing intrusive memories, thoughts or 
images may find the intrusions interview difficult or upsetting. It was therefore planned to make clear 
to participants at the start of the interview, and at any time they became distressed, that they could 
stop the interview at any point. In the event of a participant becoming distressed the interviewer 
could also ensure that additional time was available to discuss the source of distress or any concerns 
the participant may have. It was planned that any severe distress would be communicated to the 
participant’s   GP   with   their   consent, as well as signposting on to other sources or support, or 
recommending referral to the local psychology service where appropriate. No interviews were 
terminated due to participant distress, nor were any participants suffering distress to the extent that 
it was felt necessary to inform their GP or seek further support on their behalf. 
 In addition it was acknowledged that there was a risk that intrusions may link to a previous 
unresolved traumatic experience. For this reason the Structured Clinical Interview was always carried 
out first with participants being asked sensitively and directly about previous traumatic experiences. 
In the event that previous traumas were disclosed the presence of symptoms of post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) were inquired about. Participants who disclosed traumatic experiences, but who did 
not meet criteria for PTSD were asked if they wished to continue to the next part of the interview, 
and advised to stop the interview if they felt it was too distressing. It was planned to discontinue the 
interview with any participants meeting criteria for current PTSD.  
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No participants were found to be suffering from PTSD, although many participants did report that 
they had experienced traumatic events, all decided that they wished to continue with the interview. 
2.6.4 Issues arising during study 
It was planned that should any participant, in either group, disclose current or recent suicidal 
ideation; or meet criteria for previously undiagnosed or untreated major depression or anxiety 
disorder, the presence of these symptoms would be discussed with them and their consent sought 
to inform their GP. The possibility for a recommendation also to be made for a referral to the 
psychology department would also be discussed at this time. Two participants met criteria for an 
undiagnosed mood or anxiety disorder and provided their consent for their GP to be informed of this. 
 In the event of any participant being considered, by the interviewer, as at risk of self-harm or harming 
someone else, consent would be sought, if appropriate, to involve their GP and any other necessary 
agencies. However, the participant would be advised that this information would still need to be 
shared if they refused consent. No participant provided any information during the study procedure 
that would indicate they were at risk of harming themself or others. 
2.7. Procedure 
2.7.1 Interview procedure 
The first part of the interview consisted of the mood and anxiety disorders module from the 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV, along with the screening module. 
The Intrusions Interview was conducted in the second part of the interview. Responses were 
recorded using audio-recording equipment, with the participants’ consent. Four participants 
requested that their interviews not be recorded for personal reasons.  
2.7.2 Self-report questionnaires 
Wherever possible, participants completed the questionnaires without the involvement of the chief 
investigator. In cases where sensory or literacy difficulties made this impossible, it was intended that 
either the chief investigator or another suitable person, read out items and alternative responses, 
and  recorded  the  participant’s  responses.  No participant required items to be read out due to sensory 
or literacy difficulties, although several participants requested large print versions of materials. 
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It emerged early in the study that some items did pose difficulties for participants. For the most part 
this was confined to the reverse score items on the Penn State Worry Questionnaire. To ensure 
participants were able to provide answers most closely reflecting their opinions and experiences, 
questionnaires were briefly checked in participants’ presence so that missing or inconsistent answers 
could be clarified.   
2.8 Analysis 
2.8.1 Planned analysis 
Qualitative data 
The planned analysis of qualitative data was to focus on transforming qualitative descriptions of 
images, memories and thoughts into categories that could be numerically coded. This was to be 
achieved using content analysis guided by categories derived from previous work by the authors of 
the Intrusions Interview (Brewin et al., 1996) and used in the analysis of data from the Intrusions 
Interview (Patel et al., 2007). If the categories were not found to be exhaustive of themes contained 
in the current data, it was planned for additional categories to be derived from themes emerging 
from the data. It was decided that two raters would independently code the data and the inter-rater 
reliablity would be calculated.  
Statistical analysis 
It was planned to carry out correlational analysis to test the hypotheses: 
1.  The presence and severity of intrusive memories and images will decrease as worry scores 
increase. 
2.  The presence and severity of intrusive thoughts will increase as worry scores increase. 
3. Cognitive fusion, psychological inflexibility and worry together will better predict the 
likelihood of reporting intrusions than worry alone. 
4. The relationship between level of worry and intrusion severity will be accounted for by level 
of cognitive fusion and psychological inflexibility. 
 
The planned statistical analysis was to use correlational analysis to investigate the first two 
hypothesis; and to further explore data in relation to the final two hypotheses using partial 
correlations and path analysis. 
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It was also planned to carry out partial correlations to determine the effects of mood. In the event 
of sufficient participants meeting diagnostic criteria for mood or anxiety disorders, it was 
intended to split the sample into groups and perform t-tests comparing these groups. 
 
2.8.2 Handling and coding of data 
A database was constructed to hold the data from the questionnaires and interviews. Paper copies 
of all completed study materials and an encrypted memory stick holding audio files were kept in a 
locked filing cabinet. 
On inputting questionnaire data into the database it emerged that some questionnaires were 
incomplete or had been completed incorrectly. The decisions made as to how to code ambiguous 
answers are outlined below: 
1) Some questionnaires had items to which no response had been given, in all cases, there were 
only one or two items per questionnaire for which no response had been provided, they were 
therefore prorated based on that participant’s other responses. 
2) Reverse scored items on one questionnaire resulted in missing or inconsistent data. Where it 
was not possible to clarify the responses the following steps were taken: where there were 
less than three missing or inconsistent responses these were prorated based on that 
participant’s other responses; there were no cases in which there were more than three 
missing responses. This applied to data for four participants for the Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire. As this issue was identified at the beginning of recruitment, all further 
questionnaires were briefly checked in  the  participants’  presence  in  order  that  any  ambiguous  
responses could be clarified at the time. 
3) The Intrusions Interview included both qualitative and quantitative data. Data from 
quantitative items was entered into the database. Qualitative descriptions were recorded as 
close to verbatim as possible, with accuracy checked with an audio recording of the interview. 
For the few participants who did not consent to audio recording, extra care was taken to 
record answers verbatim during the interview. These descriptions were entered into a 
separate spreadsheet and themes were coded quantitatively using content analysis. All 
descriptions were coded by two independent raters. Codes for up to two themes for each 
description were then entered into the database for further analysis. 
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4) In the event that participants had reported multiple emotions in response to intrusions, the 
two with the highest intensity ratings were recorded for further analysis. In the event ratings 
were tied, the two emotions indicated by participants to be the predominant emotions linked 
with the experience, were recorded.  
5) As participants reported a wide range of emotions and many of these had only been rated by 
one or two participants, it was decided to group emotions to simplify coding. The grouping 
are as follows: 
i. Sadness, disappointment and loss  
ii. Guilt and regret 
iii. Shame and embarrassment 
iv. Anger, distaste and irritation 
v. Anxiety, fear, horror/dread. 
vi. Helplessness and pity 
vii. Happiness, contentment, reassurance, satisfaction, safety, enjoyment, 
amusement, joy, calming, lovely and pleasure  
viii. Affection, appreciation, caring,  love, interest, arousal and pride 
6) Scores for frequency, distress, uncontrollability and interference with daily activities for 
intrusions were summed to provide a single severity score. 
7) Interview sections that were not applicable to individual participants were coded as missing 
data for the purposes of data entry. 
2.9 Dissemination 
A summary of findings was sent to individual participants who completed a contact form requesting 
an individual summary. The author has provided feedback regarding the findings of the study to 
professionals and organisations involved in the recruitment process where they had indicated an 
interest in this.  
It is hoped to present the findings at conferences and to submit for publication in a peer reviewed 







3.1 Chapter overview 
This section will begin by describing the characteristics of the study sample, moving on to the 
distribution of the data and assumptions for parametric testing before detailing the revised plan for 
analysis based on the characteristics of the data collected. Data exploring the characteristics of 
intrusions will be presented followed by the main analysis. Analysis of data will be presented 
beginning with correlations between questionnaire measures, then for each hypothesis in turn. The 
section will end by exploring the tendency toward an imagery based processing style reported in this 
sample. 
3.2 Sample characteristics 
The sample consisted of 62 participants (40 female) aged between 60 and 86 years with a mean age 
of 70.3 years, all participants were white British. The mean level of worry within the sample was 37 
(sd: 16.82) which is consistent with other findings in unselected community samples of older adults 
(M:39) and slightly lower than unselected samples of younger adults (M:43) (Startup & Erickson, 
2006). There was an overall higher mean worry score for female participants (M:41, SD: 17.969) than 
for male participants (M:31, SD:12.393) this was significant at p<.05 (t (60) 2.379, p=.021, d=.65). There 
was a low level of depression within the sample, with an overall mean score of 2 on the Geriatric 
Depression Scale. 
 Occupational data was categorised according to the Standard Occupational Classification 2010 
(Office for National Statistics, 2010). Data was missing for 8% of participants, of the remainder: 40% 
are currently in work, or had worked before retirement, in professional occupations; 18% in 
administrative or secretarial occupations; 12% in skilled trades and; 12% in personal service 
occupations; the remainder had worked as managers or senior officials (5.3%), in sales and customer 
services (1.8%) or elementary occupations (e.g. waitress, cleaner). 
Of the whole sample three met DSM-IV criteria for major depressive disorder, and ten for past major 
depressive disorder, four met criteria for generalised anxiety disorder, two for a specific phobia and 
one for panic disorder, data was missing or incomplete for four participants. The majority of 
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participants (43, 73%) did not meet criteria for any mood or anxiety diagnosis. Twenty-one 
participants (37%) reported one or more traumatic experience, however none met criteria for current 
post-traumatic stress disorder.  
Interview data was available for 57 participants. Of these, 65% (37) reported experiencing one or 
more types of intrusions over the past week. More than one type of intrusion was reported by 19% 
(11) with memories and images (9%) or memories and thoughts (5%) being the most common 
combinations. 26% of participants reported experiencing intrusive memories (15), 28% intrusive 
images (16) and 32% intrusive thoughts (18).   
3.3 Distribution of data 
All continuous data was checked for skew, kurtosis and homogeneity of variance. Calculation of z 
scores was performed due to the large sample size, resulting scores indicated that data did not meet 
the normality criterion for parametric testing.  
Data from all questionnaire measures was found to be significantly positively skewed and data from 
the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) was significantly kurtotic. Log10 transformations were 
performed on all continuous data with one point added to adjust for scores of zero. Z scores for skew 
and kurtosis were non-significant for all measures, except for Geriatric Depression Scale (GDS) (ks 2.6) 
which was marginally significant using the criterion suggested by Field (2009) for larger sample sizes 
(ks 2.58). Distribution checks for data split by groups also confirmed non-normality of the distribution 
of GDS scores with significant positive skew for two of the groups (those reporting an absence of 
intrusive memories and thoughts). 
Due to the remaining deviations from normality further transformations were carried out. Square 
root and reciprocal transformations did not result in normal distribution for all data. The 
transformations that had been performed were therefore considered the best fit for the data and log 
10 transformed data were used for all further analysis.  
Homogeneity of variance between groups was assessed using the Levene test (F), and checked by 
calculating the variance  ratio  (Hartley’s  Fmax) due to the known sensitivity to sample size of the Leven 
test. For transformed data all results were non-significant except for PSWQ scores and intrusive 
memories (F (1,55) 13.389, p=.001) (Fmax 4.875). PSWQ scores were split also by sex and by the 
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tendency to think in images, results were non-significant for sex but were significant for the tendency 
to think in images (F(1,55) 6.710, p=.01) 
3.4 Revision of planned analysis 
Due to the characteristics of the data collected, it was necessary to make a revised plan for analysis. 
As a relatively small number of participants had reported experiencing intrusions in the form of 
images, memories or thoughts, this meant that only a small subsample of data was available for 
analysis of the severity of intrusions. A further implication of this was that in order to analyse the 
whole sample data, it was necessary to use the presence of intrusions alone as an outcome variable 
which is problematic as it is dichotomous and therefore precludes the use of correlational analysis. 
Due to non-normal distribution of GDS scores, non-parametric  Spearman’s  Rank-Order correlations 
were planned to establish relationships between questionnaire measures before moving onto 
examination of the study hypotheses.  
In order to examine hypotheses one and two concerning the relationship between levels of worry 
and the presence and severity of intrusions, it was decided to use independent t-tests to test the 
difference between mean worry levels for those reporting, versus not reporting, each type of 
intrusion.With the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test to be used for intrusive memory groups, 
due to heterogeneity of variance of worry scores for these groups. In order to test the association 
between the level of worry and the severity of intrusion it was decided to use Pearson’s  product-
moment correlation in the smaller sub-sample reporting intrusions, despite this being low in power 
due to a small sample size (n=15-18) 
Regression analysis was deemed the most appropriate method to assess the extent to which the 
predictor variables (worry, cognitive fusion and psychological inflexibility) were able to predict the 
outcome variable (presence of intrusions) for the entire sample. The decision was taken to exclude 
the Geriatric Depression Scale (GDS) from this analysis due to the non-normal distribution of scores.  
It was planned to assess the relationship between the severity of intrusions and all questionnaire 
measures using  Pearson’s  product-moment correlation with partial correlation to be carried out to 
further explore significant results. 
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Finally, exploratory descriptive analysis will be presented for the characteristics of intrusions and a 
non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test to test for the difference between worry scores for those 
reporting that they do or do not ever think in images. 
3.5 Characteristics of intrusions 
Tables 1 and 2 display a summary of the main characteristics of intrusions reported in this sample. 
There are low levels of intrusions reported overall, with these quite evenly distributed across the 
different types of intrusions. Thematic content of intrusions is displayed in table 2 along with 
frequencies these were assigned to descriptions by each rater. As can be seen from the table inter-
rater reliability is either good or very good for all types of intrusions. 
A general trend to increasing severity of intrusive experience can be seen from memories to images 
to thoughts. For  memories  and  images  this  is  mirrored  in  the  mean  scores  for  the  sense  of  ‘nowness’  
or reliving associated with the intrusion. There is also a shift in the most frequently reported emotion 
from sadness, for memories, to sadness, guilt and regret, for images, to anxiety for intrusive thoughts. 
This may in part be explained by a change in the content of intrusion, with relationship and family 
forming the most common theme for memories and images, but giving way to illness, injury and 
death for intrusive thoughts.  
 Table 1. Characteristics of reported intrusions, by type of intrusion 















Memories 15 (10 
female) 
Sadness 29% 39.2 (38.397) 13.33 2-115 
Images 16 (12 
female) 
Sadness 23%  
guilt/regret23% 
62.5 (65.676) 30.63 5-220 
Thoughts 18 (13 
female)  
Anxiety 30% 128.89 (109.964) na 10-400 
 
  
                                                          




Table 2. Content themes for intrusive memories, images and thoughts 
 Themes  







Memories Relationship and family  
Illness, injury and death 
Social perception  














Images Relationship and family  
Illness, injury and death 
Memorable places  
Social perception 















Thoughts Illness, injury and death  
Relationship and family 
Work or financial problems 
Social perception  
















3.6 Correlations between questionnaire measures 
Non-parametric,   Spearman’s   rank-order correlations were carried out to allow inclusion of GDS 
scores. Scores on the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) were strongly correlated with scores 
on the Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire (CFQ) and the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire -II (AAQ-
II). The CFQ and AAQ-II were strongly correlated with each other and the GDS had medium strength 
correlations with all other questionnaire measures (table 3). 
Table 3. Correlations between questionnaire measures for the full sample (n=62). 
 rs p 
PSWQ GDS .395** 0.001** 
 CFQ .845** 0.000** 
 AAQ-II .722** 0.000** 
GDS CFQ .403** 0.001** 
 AAQ-II .384** 0.002** 




3.7 Hypothesis one: The presence and severity of intrusive memories and   
images will decrease as worry scores increase. 
3.7.1 Intrusive memories 
A total of 15 participants reported experiencing at least one intrusive memory within the last week. 
Scores on the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) were compared for the two groups (those 
who reported intrusive memories and those who did not) and these are displayed graphically below 
in figure 1. As can be seen from figure 1. the mean score for the group reporting intrusions and the 
group not reporting intrusions were similar, whereas there is a large difference between the range 
of scores (26 and 64 respectively). Analysis with Mann-Whitney U test confirmed there was no 
significant difference between group means (intrusions group mean: 33 (SD: 7.48), no intrusions 
group mean: 38 (SD: 18.35), p=.852). 
The severity of intrusion score is a sum of scores for: frequency of intrusion; distress; 
uncontrollability; and interference with daily life. For the sub-sample reporting intrusive memories 
(n=15) there was a significant positive correlation between PSWQ and the severity score for the first 
reported memory of moderate strength (r =.456, p=.044) (table 6), this is in the opposite direction to 

















Figure 1. Box Plot of distribution of PSWQ scores for those reporting intrusive memories (Yes) and those not reporting 
intrusions (no)  
 
3.7.2 Intrusive Images  
A total of 16 participants reported experiencing at least one intrusive image within the last week. 
Comparison of PSWQ scores for the two groups (reporting images and not reporting images) revealed 
similar means, an independent t-test confirmed there was no significant difference between mean 
scores (Intrusions groups mean: 34 (SD: 10.24), no intrusions group mean: 37 (SD: 17.99), t(55) .133, 
p=.895). A box plot of the data (figure 2.) shows, as with intrusive memories, there is a large 
difference between the range of scores (32 and 64 respectively) for the two groups, which may reflect 
the smaller sample size of the group reporting intrusions.  
For the sub-sample reporting intrusive images (n=16) there was a negative correlation close to zero, 

















Figure 2. Box Plot of distribution of PSWQ scores for those reporting intrusive images (Yes) and those not reporting 
intrusive images (no). 
Summary 
Reports of intrusive images and memories occur over a reduced range of PSWQ scores, however, 
there is no significant difference between   these   groups’   mean   scores. The severity of intrusive 
memories was significantly positively correlated with PSWQ scores which is not in the expected 
direction based on hypothesis 1. None of the questionnaire measures correlated significantly with 
the severity of intrusive images.  
3.8  Hypothesis 2: The presence and severity of intrusive thoughts will   
increase as worry scores increase.  
3.8.1   Intrusive Thought 
A total of 18 participants reported experiencing at least one intrusive thought within the last 
week. Comparison of PSWQ scores for the two groups (yes and no to presence of intrusive 
thoughts) showed similar means, this was confirmed by independent t test which showed no 
significant difference between group means (intrusions group mean: 41 (SD: 18.62), no 
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intrusions group mean: 35 (SD: 15.2), t(58) .-1.227, p=.225). A box plot of the data (figure 3.) 
shows, in contrast with intrusive memories and images, the range of scores for the two groups 
is similar (59 and 64 respectively). 
 
For the sub-sample reporting intrusive thoughts (n=18) there was a strong significant positive 














Figure 2. Box Plot of distribution of PSWQ scores for those reporting intrusive thoughts (Yes) and those not reporting 
intrusive thoughts (no). 
Summary 
Figure 2 shows that, unlike images and memories, people who report intrusive thoughts score across 
a wider range on the PSWQ. There was no significant difference between these two groups in terms 
of mean levels of worry. For the sub-sample reporting intrusive thoughts there was a significant 
correlation between level of worry and the severity of intrusive thoughts, thus providing partial 
support for hypothesis 2.  
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3.9  Hypothesis 3: Cognitive fusion, psychological inflexibility and worry 
together will better predict the likelihood of reporting intrusions than worry 
alone. 
Separate binary logistical regressions were carried out for each type of intrusion. Analyses were run 
initially with three variables (PSWQ, CFQ and AAQ-II) and then repeated with two variables (CFQ, 
AAQ-II). The variable that had the wald statistic closest to zero was excluded for the second analysis. 
The results are displayed in tables 4 (three variables) and table 5 (two variables).  
 In addition to the normality tests already performed on the data, checks were carried out for the 
linearity of the logit and multicollinearity. As cases were unrelated, the independence of errors 
assumption was automatically met (Field, 2009, p. 273). 
Intrusive memories  
As table 4 shows, with three variables included in the model, none of the variables contributed 
significantly to prediction of the outcome (presence of intrusive memories). From the pattern of 
results it can be seen that, contrary to predictions, both PSWQ and CFQ scores had positive b values, 
in that an increase in score should lead to an increase in likelihood of intrusive memories being 
reported, neither result approached significance however. By contrast, AAQ score had a negative b 
value, indicating that an increase in score should lead to a decrease in the likelihood of intrusive 
memories being reported, this result approached significance (p=.057).  
With only two predictors in the model it can be seen that the AAQ has a significant negative 
relationship with the presence of intrusive memories (p<.05), the confidence interval (CI 95% .000-
.986) does not cross 1, therefore there is 95% confidence in the direction of the relationship (table 
5).  
Intrusive images 
In the three variable model, although the negative b values for both PSWQ and AAQ-II are in the 
expected direction, these variables are not significant predictors of imagery in this model. As can be 
seen from table 4., the b value for CFQ score is positive, indicating as scores increase so too does the 
likelihood of reports of intrusive images, the result is significant (p<.05). The 95% confidence intervals 
(CI 95% 2.86-2629514.83) do not cross one, therefore there is a 95% chance that this reflects the true 
direction of the relationship (Field, 2009, p. 289). 
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In the two variable model the negative relationship of the AAQ-II with intrusive imagery emerges as 
significant (p<.05, CI 95% .000-.841). The significant positive relationship between CFQ scores and 
the likelihood of reporting intrusive images remains (p<.05, CI 95% 1.423-176226.576).  
Intrusive thoughts 
In the three variable model the b value for PSWQ score is negative, however the result is non-
significant. For both CFQ and AAQ-II scores b values are positive and non-significant. There is no 
change in the predictive value of these variables in the two variable model. 
Table 4. Binary logistic regression analyses for intrusive memories, images and thoughts with three predictor 
variables PSWQ, CFQ and AAQ 




Intrusive memories          
PSWQ .023 3.305 .000 1 .994 1.024    
CFQ 4.183 3.191 1.718 1 .190 65.566 63.245 .075 .108 
AAQ -6.123 3.219 3.617 1 .057 .002    
          
Intrusive images          
PSWQ -3.504 3.654 .919 1 .338 .030    
CFQ 7.916 3.503 5.107 1 .024* 2742.040 61.413 .104 .150 
AAQ-II -5.391 3.207 2.826 1 .093 .005    
          
Intrusive thoughts          
PSWQ -.543 3.238 .028 1 .867 .581    
CFQ 1.054 3.050 .120 1 .730 2.870 70.810 .041 .058 
AAQ-II 1.657 2.714 .373 1 .542 5.245 






Table 5. Binary regression analyses for intrusive memories, images and thoughts with two predictor 
variables: CFQ and AAQ 




Intrusive memories          
CFQ 4.194 2.771 2.290 1 .130 66.301 63.245 .075 .108 
AAQ-II -6.117 3.114 3.859 1 .049* .002    
          
Intrusive images          
CFQ 6.216 2.991 4.318 1 .038* 500.854 62.399 .088 .127 
AAQ-II -6.271 3.111 4.063 1 .044* .002    
          
Intrusive thoughts          
CFQ  .758 2.492 .093 1 .761 2.135 70.838 .040 .057 
AAQ-II 1.540 2.627 .344 1 .558 4.664    
 
Summary 
Level of worry, as measured by the PSWQ, was not found to be a significant predictor for any type of 
intrusion. As psychological inflexibility increases, as measured by the AAQ-II, the likelihood of 
reporting intrusions decreases for both memories and images (p<.05). As cognitive fusion increases, 
as measured by the CFQ, the likelihood of reporting intrusive images increases (p<.05). None of the 
variables were found to be significantly related to the presence of intrusive thoughts. 
3.10 The relationship between level of worry and intrusion severity will be 
accounted for by level of cognitive fusion and psychological inflexibility. 
 
As can be seen from table 6, for the 32% of the sample that reported intrusion thoughts, scores on 
all questionnaire measures were significantly correlated with thought severity. Only the PSWQ was 
significantly correlated with the severity of intrusive memories and there were no significant 
correlations with the severity of images.  
Table 6. Pearson’s  Product-moment correlation between questionnaire measures and severity of intrusions 
for subsamples reporting intrusive images, memories and thoughts 
 Memories (n=15) Images (n=16) Thoughts (n=18) 
 r  (13) p r (14) p r (16) p 
PSWQ .456* .044* -.031 .454 .762** .000** 
CFQ .424 .058 .007 .489 .825** .000** 




As significant correlations were found between worry, fusion, psychological inflexibility and the 
severity of intrusive memories and thoughts, partial correlations were carried out to examine the 
relative contribution of each of these constructs to the severity of intrusions, when other constructs 
were held constant.  
The association between PSWQ scores and the severity of intrusive memories became non-significant 
when either the CFQ (r=.282, p=.328) or the AAQ-II (r=.449, p=.251) were held constant. 
The association between PSWQ scores and the severity of intrusive thoughts became marginally non-
significant when AAQ-II scores (r= .475, p=.054) were held constant and non-significant when CFQ 
scores (r= -.062, p=.813) were held constant. The association between CFQ scores and the severity of 
intrusive thoughts remained when scores were held constant for AAQ-II (r= .643, p=.005), and PSWQ 
(r=.491, p=.045). The association between AAQ-II scores and the severity of intrusive thoughts 
became non-significant when either the CFQ (r=-.107, p=.342) or PSWQ (r=.077, p=.384) were held 
constant. 
Due to the small sample size for this section of the analysis and the number of statistical tests 
performed there is a greater chance of type 1 error. These findings must therefore be interpreted 
with caution and they are presented as further exploration of the main correlational findings, which 
may indicate interactions to be examined in further research. 
Cognitive fusion and psychological inflexibility are not independently correlated with the severity of 
intrusive thoughts. Partial correlations however suggest that the relationship between worry and 
memory severity is partially accounted for by cognitive fusion. 
Worry, cognitive fusion and psychological inflexibility all correlate separately with the severity of 
intrusive thoughts. Partial correlations indicate that these relationships are not independent of one 
another, and instead indicate that the relationship between worry and the severity of intrusions may  
be accounted for by levels of cognitive fusion and, in part, by psychological inflexibility. 
3.11  Tendency to think in images 
A single question, with a further clarifier if needed, was included to give an indication of the 
participants’  self-reported preferred processing style. Whilst firm conclusions cannot be drawn from 
a single unvalidated question, the findings are reported here as another avenue that may shed some 
light on the findings and provide directions for future investigations. 
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Participants   were   asked   ‘are   you   aware   that   your   thinking   ever   consists   of   mental   images   or  
pictures?’, fifty-one participants answered this question, 11 (9 female) saying no, they did not ever 
think in images, and 40 (24 female) saying yes, they did at times think in images. The mean PSWQ 
score for those saying no, that they never thought in images was 52 (SD: 22.75) and for those saying 
yes, they did at times think in images was 32 (SD: 11.58). The difference between means is significant 
(t(49) 3.269, p=.002). 
Participants who reported that they did not think in imagery had a higher mean worry score than 





4 Discussion  
4.1 Summary of results 
The purpose of this research was: firstly to explore the presence and nature of intrusive cognitions in 
an  older  adults  sample;  secondly  to  determine  whether  an  individual’s  level  of  worry  was  related  to  
their experience of intrusive cognitions;  and  thirdly  whether  an  individual’s  level  of  cognitive  fusion 
(henceforth referred to as fusion) or psychological inflexibility (henceforth referred to as inflexibility) 
explains, or adds to the explanation of this relationship. A brief summary of results follows.   
Characteristics of Intrusions 
Intrusions were reported by 65% of the present sample, with 19% reporting that they experienced 
more than one type of intrusion. Memories were reported by 26%, images by 28% and thoughts by 
32%. 
From an exploration of the characteristics of the intrusive experiences reported, it is clear that the 
most frequent themes are associated with relationships and family; and illness, injury and death. 
Relationships and family was the most common theme for both intrusive memories and images, with 
illness, injury and death the second most common theme. The most commonly associated emotions 
were sadness, for memories and sadness, along with guilt and regret for images.  
The characteristics of intrusive thoughts were somewhat different with the most common theme 
being illness, injury and death, with relationships and family the second most common. The most 
common associated emotion was anxiety. The severity of intrusions was lowest for intrusive 
memories (M: 39) and highest for intrusive thoughts (M: 129) with intrusive images lying in between 
(M: 63). The sense of reliving accompanying intrusions was lowest for memories (M: 13.33) and 
higher for images (M: 30.63), this was not applicable for intrusive thoughts. 
Correlations between questionnaire measures 
Strong correlations were found between worry, fusion and inflexibility and between fusion and 
inflexibility. Medium strength correlations were found between depression scores and worry, fusion 
and inflexibility.  
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Hypothesis one: The presence and severity of intrusive memories and images will decrease 
as worry scores increase 
Hypothesis one was not substantiated by the findings of this study. There was a small number of 
intrusions reported overall. Reports of intrusive images and memories occurred over a reduced range 
of worry scores, however, there was no   significant   difference   between   the   groups’  mean  worry  
scores. 
For the severity of intrusions, worry scores were significantly correlated with intrusive memories but 
not intrusive images. The direction of the relationship indicates that as worry scores increase, so too 
does the severity of intrusive memories, which is contrary to hypothesis one.  
Hypothesis two: The presence and severity of intrusive thoughts will increase as worry 
scores increase 
Hypothesis two was partially substantiated. In contrast to images and memories, reports of intrusive 
thoughts occurred across a wide range of worry scores. There was no significant difference between 
those who reported experiencing intrusive thoughts and those who did not in terms of mean levels 
of worry. For the sub-sample reporting intrusive thoughts there was a significant correlation between 
level of worry and the severity of intrusive thoughts.  
Hypothesis 3:  Cognitive fusion, psychological inflexibility and worry together will better predict the 
likelihood of reporting intrusions than worry aloneThe findings of this study partially support 
hypothesis three, however, the pattern of findings are more complex than predicted by this 
hypothesis. 
As inflexibility increased, so the likelihood of reporting intrusions decreased for both memories and 
images. As fusion increased, the likelihood of reporting intrusive images increased.  
Neither inflexibility nor fusion significantly related to the presence of intrusive thoughts (as opposed 
to memories or images) in this sample. Level of worry did not significantly predict the presence of 
intrusive memories, images or thoughts in this sample.   
The findings indicate that level of inflexibility and fusion impacts the presence (or reporting) of 
imagery-based intrusions (memories and images), whereas worry does not. The pattern of findings 
suggest that fusion and flexibility are better predictors of the reporting of intrusions than is worry. 
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Hypothesis 4: The relationship between level of worry and intrusion severity will be accounted for 
by level of cognitive fusion and psychological inflexibility. 
Level of worry was significantly associated with the severity of both intrusive memories and thoughts. 
Whilst this is as predicted for intrusive thoughts, it is contrary to predictions for intrusive memories. 
Both fusion and inflexibility are positively correlated with severity of intrusive thoughts but not 
memories or images. 
Worry, fusion and inflexibility were all found to be separately associated with the severity of intrusive 
thoughts. Partial correlations indicated that these relationships were not independent of one 
another. Instead, the results indicate that the relationship between worry and the severity of 
intrusions may be explained by level of fusion and influenced by level of inflexibility. The relationship 
between level of worry and intrusive memory was also partly accounted for by level of cognitive 
fusion and to a lesser degree by inflexibility. 
Tendency to think in images 
The group of participants reporting that they do not ever think in images had a significantly higher 
mean worry score that those reporting that they do, at least occasionally, think in images. When 
considered together with the observed pattern of reported intrusive memories, images and thoughts 
an interesting parallel emerges. 
 Although there was no significant difference in mean worry score for groups experiencing and not 
experiencing intrusions, less intrusive memories and images were reported at higher levels of worry. 
This mirrors the tendency for those who report that they do not ever think in imagery to have higher 
levels of worry. As intrusive thoughts would be unaffected by this tendency they would be expected 
to be reported across the spectrum of worry, as is observed in this sample. 
 
4.2 Detailed discussion of results 
 
4.2.1 Intrusive Experiences  
Intrusive experiences were reported by 65% of the sample. Each type of intrusion however, was 
reported at relatively low levels, by between a quarter and a third of participants.  
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In previous research, intrusive memories have been reported to be a common phenomena, albeit 
not as common as intrusive thoughts (Brewin et al., 1996). The content of intrusive memories has 
been found to relate most commonly to themes of illness, injury and death (Brewin et al. 1996; 
Brewin et al. 1998; Patel et al., 2007), which in the current study was found to be the second most 
common theme. The emotions most commonly associated with memories is also relatively 
consistent between studies, with sadness frequently reported as the most, or one of the most 
commonly associated emotions (Brewin et al., 1996; Patel et al., 2007). The finding that relationship 
and family in this study was the most common theme for intrusive memories, may reflect the low 
level of depression in this sample whilst other studies have used depressed samples or mixed 
samples with both depressed and non-depressed individuals.  
 The proportion of participants reporting intrusive memories is consistent with findings by Brewin 
et al. (1998) in a sample of cancer patients aged 24-81yrs (mean 54yrs). Using an interview 
measure, 23 per cent of the sample reported intrusive memories. There was significant variation 
within the sample however. Those who were severely depressed were 4 times more likely to report 
intrusive memories (43%) than were non-depressed patients (11%). Patel et al. (2007) used the 
Intrusions Interview to explore intrusive memories and images in depressed patients. Intrusive 
memories were reported by 44 per cent of the sample. A still higher level of intrusive memories 
was found by Reynolds and Brewin (1999) with 73 per cent of the sample reporting that they had 
recently experienced an intrusive memory. In the same study, 98 per cent of participants diagnosed 
with PTSD reported experiencing one or more intrusive memories in the past week. The higher 
levels reported by depressed participants in this sample may relate to the methodology; 
participants were first asked about negative life events and traumatic experiences which may have 
primed them to recollect more intrusive memories associated with these events. 
In the current study intrusive images were reported at a simiar rate to intrusive memories, however 
comparison with the literature in this area is complicated by the fact that many studies have not 
drawn a distinction between the two. In a study of intrusive experiences in a non-clinical 
population, Parkinson and Rachman (1981a) found that 40 out of 60 participants reported that they 
experience intrusive imagery (including memories) whereas 58 out of 60 reported that they 
experience intrusive thoughts. Findings from another study suggest that the occurrence of intrusive 
images (not including memories) may be linked to stress. Parkinson and Rachman (1981b), found 
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that 16 out of 25 mothers under stress (with a child in hospital) reported experiencing intrusive 
images whereas, four out of 25 mothers not under stress reported such images.  
The occurrence of intrusive images under conditions of stress or anxiety is consistent with findings 
from participants with anxiety disorders who report experiencing intrusive images in anxiety 
provoking situations. One such study found that 100 per cent of agoraphobic patients reported 
images in agoraphobic type situations (Day et al., 2004); in another, 77 per cent of social phobia 
patients reported intrusive imagery in social situations (Hackmann et al., 1998). In contrast, only 
five per cent of depressed patients reported intrusive imagery (as opposed to memories) (Patel et 
al., 2007). 
Of direct relevance to the current findings, is a study comparing patients with panic disorder and 
GAD  (Breitholtz et al., 1998). The authors reported that 32 per cent of panic patients and 27 per 
cent of GAD patients reported experiencing intrusive images (including memories). These findings 
are surprising given the findings in the current study that those reporting that they did not ever 
think in imagery had a higher mean worry score and that few images were reported by high 
worriers. There are considerable differences however in the mean level of depression reported in 
the current sample, which was very low, to that of Breitholtz et al. (1998) which indicated mild to 
moderate depression. In light of previous findings in relation to depression and intrusive memories 
(Patel et al., 2007), direct comparison between these samples is difficult.   
Levels of intrusive imagery in control groups have been reported to vary between zero per cent for 
agoraphobic situations (Day et al., 2004) to 47 per cent for social situations (Hackmann et al., 1998). 
Levels of intrusive imagery in an unselected community sample are not available for direct 
comparison; however it appears that intrusive imagery is a highly variable phenomenon, depending 
at least in part on state anxiety (Hackmann et al., 1998)  and stress level (Parkinson & Rachman, 
1981b), the measurement of which were beyond the scope of the present study. In addition Brewin 
et al. (2010) have highlighted the issue of methodological differences between studies and the lack 
of validated tools for capturing the experience of intrusive images. In a review of studies in this 
area, Brewin et al. (2010) reported that rates of imagery reported tend to be lower when 
participants are asked about experiences over a restricted time period. This is consistent with the 
idea that intrusive imagery varies depending on the current situation and state of the individual 
rather than remaining stable over time. This is particularly important when considered in context of 
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the findings of the current study and suggest that the low levels of imagery reported may be owing, 
at least in part, to the restricted time frame of one week inquired about in the Intrusions Interview.   
The time frame of inquiry may also be an important factor in the reporting of intrusive thoughts. 
Intrusive thoughts have been found to be a common experience (Rachman & de Silva, 1978) and 
are the most commonly reported type of intrusion (Brewin et al., 1996). They are, however, 
reported to be less frequent in older adults (Magee & Teachman, 2012). The relatively low levels 
reported in this sample may be owing to the reduced frequency of these experiences in older age. 
Magee and Teachman (2012) found that older adults reported experiencing intrusive thoughts on 
average between once per week and once per month, compared to between once per day and 
once per several days for younger adults. In the current study, participants were asked about their 
experiences  over  the  past  week.  Magee  and  Teachman’s  (2012)  findings  suggest  that  although  a  
participant may experience intrusive thoughts in general, they may not experience them with 
sufficient frequency for this to be picked up on the Intrusions Interview.  
The emotion most commonly associated with intrusive thoughts reported in this sample differed 
from imagery based intrusions (images and memories). Whilst sadness was most commonly 
associated with imagery based intrusions, anxiety was most commonly associated with intrusive 
thoughts. A similar finding was reported by Brewin et al. (1996); whilst sadness and happiness were 
most commonly associated with intrusive memories, fear was most commonly associated with 
intrusive thoughts. This findings adds further weight to the argument that different forms of 
intrusions represent different phenomena which are likely to relate differently to other constructs.  
4.2.2 Hypothesis one: the presence and severity of intrusive memories and images will 
decrease as the severity of worry increases 
Previous research has found that autobiographical memories most commonly consist of detailed 
visual scenes linked to an original experience (Patel et al., 2007). It has also been argued that 
projecting oneself into the past or future relies on very similar mechanisms (D'Argembeau & Van Der 
Linden, 2006). It was therefore expected that intrusive memories may have similar characteristics to 
intrusive images and relate to other study variables in similar ways. 
Characteristics of these two types of intrusions are similar with respect to the proportion of the 
sample reporting them, content themes, and associated emotions. Mean scores for severity and 
reliving were however lower for memories than for images. 
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Hypothesis one was based firstly, on research that shows that imagery is capable of eliciting emotion, 
more so than verbally based cognitions (Holmes & Mathews, 2010) and secondly, theories and 
research suggesting that worry may serve as a means to avoid distressing emotional experiences 
(experiential avoidance) (Borkovec, 1994; Hayes et al., 1996). It was therefore expected that as levels 
of worry increased across the sample, less intrusive images and memories would be reported due to 
this avoidant function. Furthermore it was expected that the severity of intrusions would be linked 
with the motivation to avoid and so would decrease as worry increased. 
The hypothesised relationship between the presence of non-verbal intrusions and worry was not 
substantiated by the findings. In the present sample, no significant difference was found between 
mean worry scores between those reporting, or not reporting, memories or images, nor did worry 
significantly predict the presence or absence of non-verbal intrusions in a logistic regression analysis. 
The observed pattern of results shows that reports of non-verbal intrusions occurred over a reduced 
range of worry scores with no reports of intrusions by the highest worriers in the sample (those with 
PSWQ score above 50). Participants reporting that they did not experience intrusions were, however, 
distributed throughout the sample, which may account for the similar mean scores between groups.  
Related to the tendency to experience intrusive memories and images is the tendency to experience, 
or be aware of, cognitions consisting of images or mental pictures. Exploratory analysis of a single 
question  relating  to  individuals’  tendency  to  think in images revealed that those who reported that 
they do not ever think in imagery have a significantly higher mean worry score than those that do. 
While conclusions that can be drawn from a single question are limited, there are some interesting 
questions and implications arising from this finding. Firstly, it seems reasonable to suggest that the 
experiencing of intrusive images is reliant on, at least occasional, thinking in images, this finding is 
therefore consistent with hypothesis one. Secondly, it raises the question as to why the tendency to 
think in images should be linked to level of worry. 
One possible explanation for this finding lies in the age range of the current sample. As this study 
looked at older adults, it may be presumed that their level of tendency to worry may be longstanding. 
Chronic avoidance of images by high worriers,  as  suggested  in  Borkovec’s  avoidance  theory  of  worry  
(Borkovec, 1994) may conceivably lead to a preference for a verbal processing style. Hirsch and 
Mathews (2012) suggest that processing habits may become more automated over time leading to a 
tendency   for  worry   to   ‘grow’.   It  would   be   interesting   therefore   to   see   this   finding   extended   and 
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investigated across age ranges, based on these arguments it would be expected that in younger age 
groups this difference would be seen to a lesser degree, or not at all. 
An alternative explanation may lie in the different effects of thinking about a worrisome topic in 
verbal or imagery form. Separate studies have shown that engaging in imagery on a worrisome topic 
(Stokes & Hirsch, 2010) or following exposure to a stressor (Butler, Wells, & Dewick, 1995) results in 
a reduction of intrusive thoughts. Conversely, engaging in verbal processing (worry) was associated 
with an increase in intrusive thoughts which is thought to result from inhibition of emotional 
processing. One possible explanation for the finding that those who do not ever think in imagery have 
a higher mean worry score, is that a verbal processing style leads to a vulnerability for excessive 
worry. As this vulnerability should be present across age groups, a replication with a younger age 
group may help to clarify the mechanism involved. 
These two explanations are not, of course, mutually exclusive, a coping style characterised by 
experiential avoidance, particularly of emotionally laden imagery, may lead to an individual 
preference for a verbal processing style. In turn this may maintain the worry process through 
inhibition of emotional processing resulting in maintenance of intrusive thoughts that in turn act as 
triggers for further worry. This is speculative at this stage and requires testing through further 
research.  
Summary 
It was not possible to demonstrate conclusively in this sample that higher levels of worry are 
associated with lower levels of reported intrusive memories and images. A related finding that 
participants who reported they did not ever think in images tended to report a higher level of worry, 
suggests this warrants further study. Alternative possible explanations were put forward for the 
relationship between processing style and level of worry, suggesting that the long-term avoidance of 
worry may lead to a preference for a verbal processing style, or that verbal processing style may 
constitute a risk factor for the development of excessive worry. 
The findings related to the severity of intrusive memories and images will be considered along with 
hypothesis four to avoid duplication. 
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4.2.3 Hypothesis two: the presence and severity of intrusive thoughts will increase as 
worry scores increase. 
Evidence from multiple research studies shows that intrusive thoughts increase following verbal 
processing of a worry topic (Stokes & Hirsch, 2010) and are increased by a period of worry after 
exposure to a stressor (Butler, Wells, & Dewick, 1995). It has also been reported that worriers will 
report more frequent distractions by negative thoughts than non-worriers during a monotonous task 
(Borkovec et al., 1983). Based on these, and similar, findings it was hypothesised that the more an 
individual tends to worry, the more they will tend to experience intrusive thoughts. 
The results of the current study did not support the hypothesis that the likelihood of reporting 
intrusive thoughts would increase as worry scores increase, which may be owing to the relatively 
small number of high worriers within the sample. A slightly higher proportion of the sample reported 
experiencing recent intrusive thoughts compared to memories or images (18 compared to 15 and 16 
respectively). 
The results did show that the severity of intrusive thoughts increased as worry scores increased. The 
severity score is made up of individual scores for frequency, distress, uncontrollability and 
interference with daily life. Although individuals with higher levels of worry may not have an 
increased likelihood of experiencing, versus not experiencing, intrusive thoughts, they may 
experience a higher frequency of thoughts, or experience their thoughts as more distressing, 
uncontrollable or perceive them to interfere to a greater degree with their daily lives. 
The finding that the severity of intrusive thoughts increases as worry scores increase is consistent 
with research finding increased frequency of intrusive thoughts after a worry period as well as reports 
that high worriers diagnosed with generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) experience their worries as 
more uncontrollable and pervasive than those without GAD (Craske et al., 1989).   
4.2.4 Hypotheses three and four: Cognitive fusion, psychological inflexibility and worry 
together will better predict the likelihood of reporting intrusions than worry alone. The 
relationship between level of worry and intrusion severity will be accounted for by level 
of cognitive fusion and psychological inflexibility. 
Or : Cognitive fusion, psychological inflexibility and worry together will better predict and explain the presence 
and severity of intrusive experiences than will worry alone. Psychological inflexibility and in its converse, 
flexibility, are central to the Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) model of psychological ill 
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health. Psychological inflexibility refers to the extent to which psychological reactions dominate in 
guiding behaviour over chosen values and the contingencies of the present situation. This often leads 
to attempts to avoid experiencing unwanted internal events (i.e. experiential avoidance) (Bond et al., 
2011). Cognitive fusion is a component of psychological inflexibility and refers the extent to which an 
individual   is   ‘fused’   to   their   thoughts  or   responds   to   them   ‘as   if’   they  were   an  external   event or 
literally true (Gillanders et al., under review). 
In the context of intrusions, it may be expected that the higher the level of fusion, the more an 
individual  would  tend  to  respond  to  an  intrusion  ‘as  if’  it  were  an  actual  event.  It  would  follow  that  
those high in fusion may experience intrusions as more distressing than those low in fusion. In 
individuals high in inflexibility, an event, such as an intrusion, leading to distressing emotions would 
be more likely to trigger experiential avoidance. Given the theorised avoidance function of worry, it 
seems likely that there would be a link between level of inflexibility and the tendency to use worry 
as a form of avoidance. It was therefore hypothesised that fusion, inflexibility and worry together 
would better predict the presence of intrusions than worry alone and that the relationship between 
worry and severity of intrusions would be explained by levels of fusion and inflexibility. 
4.2.4.1 Intrusive Memories and images 
Increasing levels of inflexibility predicted a decrease in the reporting of intrusive memories and 
images. Increasing levels of fusion predicted an increase in the reporting of intrusive images but not 
memories. Increasing levels of worry predicted an increase in memory severity but not image 
severity. 
The findings for decreased reporting of intrusions as inflexibility increased may be interpreted as 
evidence that these phenomena are being actively avoided. This is consistent with a study that 
demonstrated that participants’ high experiential avoidance (based on scores on the AAQ-I) showed 
increased avoidance (as indicated by reaction time delay) to aversive images, compared to a low 
experiential avoidance group (Cochrane et al., 2007). Furthermore, the same study study found an 
increase in left-hemisphere activity (as indicated by event-related potentials) in response to aversive 
imagery for participants high in experiential avoidance. One explanation for this, is that individuals 
high in experiential avoidance use verbal processing strategies (e.g. worry) to cope with aversive 
images and the associated distress (Cochrane et al., 2007). In the current study, no relationship was 
found between the presence of intrusive memories or images and the level of worry. It may be that 
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the number of participants with high levels of worry was insufficient to detect an effect, or that worry 
is only one avoidance strategy used by individuals with high inflexibility and high experiential 
avoidance. 
Memories and images, as image-based intrusions were expected to share similar characteristics and 
relate to study variables in similar ways. As described above, both types of intrusions share similar 
characteristics, however there are important differences in how they relate to fusion and worry. 
Fusion was found to be a significant predictor of the occurrence of intrusive images. This is consistent 
with higher levels of fusion leading to increased awareness of intrusions and an increase in the 
perceived distress associated with them. The mean severity rating was higher for images than for 
memories, thus when combined with high fusion, distressing images would be likely to trigger 
avoidance. As it was found, both that increased levels of fusion led to increased occurrence of images, 
and increased inflexibility led to decreased occurrence of images, it may be that there is a threshold 
of experience below which increased fusion leads to increased awareness of intrusions and above 
which avoidance leads to intrusions no longer entering awareness.  
Given that the mean severity ratings for images were higher than for memories, it may, at first, seem 
counter-intuitive that there was not a link between image severity and level of worry. The 
explanation of this may lie in the association (or lack thereof) between image severity and fusion. 
Thus an individual may experience severe intrusive imagery but if they do not respond to these 
experiences as if they were literally true, but instead as transient thoughts, they would not be 
motivated to avoid. Thus, when an individual experiences severe intrusive images and has high 
fusion, attempts to avoid the experience will be initiated. Over time, repeated practice at avoiding 
distressing intrusions may result in these intrusions no longer reaching conscious awareness. That 
level of fusion is predictive of the reporting of intrusive images and inflexibility/experiential 
avoidance is negatively predictive of intrusive images is consistent with this explanation, however 
this requires testing through further research. 
Fusion was not found to be a significant predictor of the occurrence of intrusive memories. Given 
that an individual who is high in fusion is more likely to respond to an intrusion as if it were a current 
event, it may be that the contextual information present in a memory in some way guarded against 
this effect. Ehlers and Clark (2000) suggest that, as experiences are incorporated into 
autobiographical memory, the information they contain is both organised and elaborated. This is 
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thought to enhance intentional retrieval and reduce involuntary (intrusive) triggering. Memories 
reported in this study had been involuntarily triggered, but the sense of reliving (nowness) was 
relatively low, which may indicate that these memories had undergone a higher degree of 
organisation and elaboration, than had the images reported, which were accompanied by a greater 
sense of reliving. That this offers a full interpretation is cast into doubt however by the pattern of 
findings for memory severity.  
Within the small subsample of those reporting memories, increasing severity of intrusions was 
associated with increasing worry scores. This became non-significant when either fusion or 
inflexibility scores were held constant, although a moderate strength correlation remained between 
worry and memory severity when holding inflexibility constant. Neither fusion nor inflexibility were 
independently significantly associated with the severity of intrusive memories, although, that, for 
fusion approached significance (p=.058).  
The fact that intrusive memories were reported by these participants indicates that they were either 
not motivated to, or not successful at, avoiding these intrusions despite the fact that levels of worry 
were associated with higher levels of severity. It seems plausible that the more severe an intrusion is 
perceived to be, the more likely it is that worry will be triggered as a coping strategy. That this 
relationship is partly explained by the level of fusion may suggest that worry is only triggered when 
an individual has a higher level of fusion.  
Given that memories of increasing severity are associated with increasing levels of worry and that 
this relationship is partly accounted for by level of cognitive fusion, it may be expected that the 
occurrence of memories would also be associated with these variables.  One explanation why this 
may not be the case, is that memories for past events can be associated with both worry and 
rumination. This is consistent with findings from a study using the Intrusions Interview to investigate 
intrusive memories and images in depression. The authors reported that intrusive memories were 
more common than images (Patel et al., 2007), and in a separate study, clinical improvement of 
depression was reported through imagery re-scripting as a stand-alone treatment (Brewin et al., 
2009). Whilst some memories may trigger concerns for the future, and so experiential avoidance (e.g. 
through worry), others may trigger rumination on past events, mood states or failures (McLaughlin 
et al., 2007). It is possible therefore that cognitive fusion may be related either to an increase, or a 
decrease in the occurrence of intrusions depending on the implications of the intrusion for the 
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individual. As this study was not designed to detect such a relationship, further research is needed to 
confirm or modify this hypothesis. 
A question remains as to why memories and images related differently to worry and cognitive fusion 
in this study. One interpretation of the observed pattern relies on memories as accounts of past 
events. Memories for past events that have been successfully incorporated into autobiographical 
memory as evidenced  by  lower  levels  of  reliving  or  ‘nowness’  would  not  be  expected  to  be  associated  
with high distress, frequency, uncontrollability and interference in daily life (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). It 
may be reasoned therefore, that intrusive memories are only experienced as severe when an 
individual has higher levels of fusion. An individual may then respond to a distressing memory either 
with experiential avoidance or rumination, as discussed above. Images, on the contrary may relate 
to any period of time and may occur out of context, their severity therefore may be related to the 
triggering of here and now emotions and relatively unrelated to levels of fusion. Individuals who have 
high levels of cognitive fusion may however, be more likely to be aware of, and so report intrusive 
images.  
Summary 
The higher the level of fusion the more distressing an intrusion would be perceived to be. In 
individuals high in inflexibility, intrusions leading to distressing emotions may be more likely to trigger 
experiential avoidance. Given the theorised avoidance function of worry, worry may function as one 
form of experiential avoidance. 
Individuals with low levels of cognitive fusion may experience severe intrusions without the need to 
avoid them. That memory severity was more closely associated with worry, than was imagery 
severity, and the occurrence of images was associated with fusion whereas occurrence of memories 
was not suggests that intrusive memories and images may serve different functions or be triggered 
and maintained in different ways. The differences may be explained by the greater past orientation 
of memories as well as the increased availability of contextual information, and the link between 
memories and rumination.  
4.2.4.3 Intrusive Thoughts 
In the current sample, the occurrence of intrusive thoughts was distributed across levels of worry 
and was not significantly predicted by levels of worry, cognitive fusion nor psychological inflexibility. 
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The severity of intrusive thoughts was positively associated with worry, cognitive fusion and 
psychological inflexibility. 
A link between intrusive thoughts and worry has been repeatedly demonstrated (e.g. Borkovec et al., 
1983; Butler et al. , 1995; Stokes & Hirsch, 2010). Whilst the presence of intrusive thoughts was not 
significantly predicted by worry in this sample, there was an association between worry and the 
severity of intrusive thought (which includes frequency) which is consistent with previous research 
(e.g. Butler et al. 1995).  Consistent with the link between worry and intrusion severity are the 
characteristics of intrusions in this sample, in contrast to memories and images, the most frequent 
theme was illness, injury and death and the most commonly associated emotion, anxiety. 
Unsurprisingly, given the characteristics of intrusive thoughts in this sample, intrusive thoughts were 
associated with the highest mean severity rating.  
The severity of intrusive thoughts was associated with worry, cognitive fusion and psychological 
inflexibility. However, only the level of cognitive fusion remained significantly positively associated 
with thought severity when controlling for the other variables.  
Individuals  high  in  cognitive  fusion  are  more  likely  to  respond  to  their  thought  ‘as  if’  they  were  literally 
true. Given that the most common theme for intrusive thoughts was illness, injury or death and the 
most commonly associated emotion, anxiety, it seems likely that these internal events could be 
experienced as very distressing. This is supported by the higher mean severity score for intrusive 
thoughts. For an individual who is also high in psychological inflexibility this would motivate attempts 
to avoid the internal experience (experiential avoidance) thus activating worry as a form of cognitive 
avoidance. Given the ability of short periods of worry to incubate intrusive thoughts (Wells & 
Papageorgious, 1995), this is likely to lead to further intrusions and a vicious cycle of worry leading 
to increased intrusions and increased intrusions leading to more worry.  
Summary 
These findings are based on a small sub-sample of participants who reported experiencing intrusive 
thoughts and requires replication and extension in a larger sample in order to draw firm conclusions. 
Within the current sample, thoughts were the most commonly reported intrusive experience and 
occurred across the spectrum of worry. The relationship of the severity of intrusive thoughts to worry 
is consistent with previous research findings that worry leads to increased frequency of intrusions 
(e.g. Borkovec et al., 1983). The finding that severity of intrusive thoughts is also associated with 
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fusion and inflexibility, and that only the relationship with fusion remains when controlling for other 
variables, indicates that the stance an individual takes in relation to intrusive thoughts is related to 
the severity of those intrusions.   
4.3 Conclusions 
The Avoidance Theory of worry  asserts  that  ‘worry  functions  as  a  cognitive  avoidance  response,  both  
to  perceived  threats  in  the  future  and  to  aversive  images  or  other  internal  experiences  like  emotions’  
(Sibrava & Borkovec, 2006, p. 251). Building on the work of Borkovec (1994), the Acceptance Based 
Model suggests that worry is an experiential avoidance strategy (Hayes et al., 1996). Both models 
propose that worry is maintained by the negative reinforcement of a short term reduction in arousal 
but with the consequence of a reduction in emotional processing and so a maintenance of 
threatening associations (Roemer et al., 2005).   
The current study builds on these theories by exploring the relationships between two key concepts 
in the ACT literature, psychological inflexibility (together with experiential avoidance) and cognitive 
fusion, and how these and worry are related to different forms of intrusive experience in an older 
adult population. 
Intrusive memories, images and thoughts were all present in relatively low levels across a sample of 
community dwelling older adults. Intrusive memories and images shared many similarities including 
content, associated emotions and how they related to inflexibility. Intrusive thoughts were 
characterised by different content, emotions, increased severity and different relationships with 
study variables. The finding of differences between intrusions based predominantly on imagery 
(memories and images) and those based on verbal thought is consistent with findings by Hagenaars 
et al., (2010) which suggests that intrusive images and thoughts are in fact different phenomena. The 
current study further adds to this literature by proposing that memories, images and thoughts all 
relate differently to other constructs and may serve different functions as well as relating in different 
ways to psychopathology.  
Intrusive memories have been found to be common among depressed patients (Patel et al., 2007). 
This is consistent with the interpretation of the findings of the current study suggesting that 
individuals with high cognitive fusion may respond to intrusive memories either through experiential 
avoidance or rumination. As rumination was not measured in the current study, this hypothesis 
requires direct testing through further research. 
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Intrusive imagery has been found to characterise a number of anxiety disorders. This study finds little 
evidence for a role of intrusive images or memories in the development or maintenance of worry in 
this sample of older people. Instead the findings suggest that severe intrusive images are only related 
to the tendency for experiential avoidance when individuals also experience high fusion, and may 
therefore occur without avoidance in individuals with lower levels of fusion. This indicates that, it is 
the occurrence of intrusive images in the context of cognitive fusion that is linked to psychopathology 
rather than the experience of images alone. Other finding suggest that the experience of intrusive 
imagery may be extremely variable and  related  to  current  circumstances  and  an  individual’s  level  of  
anxiety and stress. These experiences may therefore not be best captured by inquiring about a 
restricted time period. 
The current study found that inflexibility and experiential avoidance are associated with worry and 
negatively associated with the occurrence of intrusive memories and images. This is consistent with 
the theoretical view of worry as a form of avoidance (Borkovec, 1994; Roemer et al., 2005). It was 
also found that worry, fusion and inflexibility were associated with increasing severity of intrusive 
thoughts. This lends further support to the argument that worry is associated both with avoidance 
and with the long-term maintenance of threatening associations leading to further intrusions. The 
findings of the current study further suggest a role for cognitive fusion in pathological conditions 
involving all forms of intrusive experiences. 
A number of limitations of the current study preclude drawing firm conclusions from these findings 




Care must be taken with generalising the results of this study due to the homogenous nature of the 
sample. Participants were all from a white, British background and 40% had backgrounds in 
profession such as teaching and healthcare indicating a high general level of education within the 
sample. There were also more female participants than male (65% versus 35%) which is significant 
given that gender differences are consistently found on measures of worry, with women tending to 
have higher scores (Robichaud et al., 2003), and this was confirmed by the results of this study. Worry 
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scores have also been found to be effected by age, with older adults in general tending to score lower 
than younger adults (Hunt et al., 2003) or middle aged adults (Skarborn & Nicki, 2000)  but with some 
evidence that worry may rise again amongst the oldest-old (Neikrug, 2003). Detailed analysis by age 
and gender was, unfortunately beyond the scope of this study, however, a tendency toward lower 
worry scores among older adults may have impacted on recruitment of individuals with higher worry 
scores. 
Interpretation of the results is restricted by the relatively small number of high worriers in the 
sample. One possibility is that with larger number of participants intrusive thoughts and images 
would have been distributed more evenly across the spectrum of worry scores. It is, however, 
interesting to compare the pattern of memories and images with that of thoughts, although there 
were similarly small numbers of participants reporting intrusive thoughts, these were distributed 
across the spectrum of worry, whereas those for memories and images were not.   
It was originally intended that recruitment across both clinical and non-clinical settings would allow 
recruitment of participants evenly distributed across the spectrum of worry. In reality, recruitment 
through mental health services for older adults encountered a number of related problems. Mental 
health and, in particular, psychology services are a scare resource for older adults. Where services 
are available therefore, they serve predominantly secondary and tertiary levels of care. This led to 
difficulty related to the severity and comorbidity of the patient population. The numbers of patients 
meeting the study criteria was small, a number of participants who met the inclusion criteria, also 
met exclusion criteria due to current severity of their mental ill health. A related difficulty is that it 
may be expected that patients with very high levels of worry and comorbidity may worry about taking 
part in research, or have difficulty in making a decision, and therefore be reluctant to contact the 
researcher. These complications indicate that a more representative sample may have been recruited 
through general primary care, rather than specialist services.  
Reporting of intrusions 
As described above, whilst 65 per cent of the sample reported intrusions, there were relatively low 
numbers of participants reporting each type of intrusion. Comparison to previous research indicates 
that restricting inquiry to the past week may have led to under-reporting, particularly of images and 
thoughts in this sample. In addition, there are a number of other methodological considerations that 
may have impacted on the reporting of intrusions. It may be that for the majority of individuals, 
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intrusions may be relatively fleeting and untroublesome and therefore not be recalled in retrospect. 
It is also possible that highly avoidant individuals would avoid talking about distressing intrusions, 
this would be in line with a finding that participants high in experiential avoidance were less likely to 
agree to participate in a further study involving aversive images (Cochrane et al.,2007). It may also 
be that older people are less used to reporting on these experiences or that cohort beliefs about 
sharing of private experiences lead this group to respond differently to the intrusions interview. It 
may also be that intrusive experiences in general are less common, or less frequent in older age. Due 
to vast differences in methodologies employed as well as populations sampled in studies of intrusive 
experiences it is difficult to determine the precise impact of these factors on the current findings. 
 Due to the small number of participants reporting each type of intrusive experience this meant that 
parts of the analysis were completed on only a small sub-sample which dramatically reduces the 
power and increases the risk of type II errors. The number of correlations conducted on this data also 
increases the risk of type one error, it was not considered appropriate to conduct a Bonferroni 
correction due to the possibility of increasing type II errors. The adoption of a more conservative 
significance level was considered, however on closer examination of the data, it was adjudged that 
whilst this would reduce the likelihood of type I errors, it would also reduce the meaningfulness of 
the data. It was therefore decided to interpret the findings with caution and as an indication of 
relationships that warrant further investigation, rather than conclusive findings. 
A difficulty of interpretation lies in the fact that although the presence of intrusions was restricted in 
range, the absence of intrusions was not. The reporting of the occurrence of intrusive memories and 
images was restricted to worry scores from 23 to 49 and 17 to 49 respectively. In contrast, the 
absence of intrusive images and memories was reported across the range of worry scores (16-80). 
This wider distribution of worry scores for those not reporting intrusions may have given rise to the 
similar mean scores between groups. This suggests that not reporting experiencing intrusive images 
or memories during a given week is influenced by multiple factors, and indicates that an improved 
tool for capturing the tendency to experience intrusions is required to more accurately assess the 
relationship with worry. 
The low reporting of intrusions in this sample suggests that there are many possible factors 
influencing whether an individual experiences, or reports experiencing, intrusions during a given 
week, with worry being just one such. There are also indications that different factors may influence 
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the experience of, or reporting of, different types of intrusions. Taken together with the lack of 
consistently used and validated tools for capturing the experience of intrusions, in order for research 
in this area to progress, there is an urgent need for the development of validated tools. 
A measure of the tendency to experience intrusions in different forms may provide less specific 
information about the characteristics of individual intrusions but may capture a better sense of an 
individual’s   overall   experience   of   intrusion.   Not   being   required   to   give   a   description   of   specific  
intrusions may enhance responding among highly avoidant individuals. Another option for more 
accurate recording of intrusive experiences would be prospective recording of intrusions over a 
longer period of time, through experience sampling, which would allow the detailed capture of 
characteristics of intrusions without the difficulties associated with retrospective recollection. The 
development of a new tool to capture the experience of intrusions in this population was beyond the 
scope of this study, consequently, study design was limited by currently available measures.  
Confounding variables 
It was intended to include a measure of depression (GDS) in the analyses to rule out the effects being 
due to mood and to check for possible suppressor effects of mood on the relationships between 
study variables. Due to the non-normal distribution of the GDS data (which persisted following a 
number of transformations), the decision was taken to exclude data for this measure from the 
analysis. This limited the interpretation of the data and the inclusion of a measure of mood 
disturbance may have added much to the understanding of the relationships between variables.   
Due to the small number of participants meeting diagnostic criteria for GAD within this study sample, 
it was not possible to analyse the data according to diagnostic groups, this is problematic as it is 
known that there are differences between high worriers with and without GAD. Previous research 
also suggests a link between depression and intrusive memories (Patel, et al., 2007), which suggests 
that depression was a potential confounding factor. 
4.5 Research implications 
The present study is the only study, known to the author, to have examined links between cognitive 
fusion, psychological flexibility, worry and the experience of intrusions in different forms. The current 
study is exploratory in nature, however the findings of relationships between study variables seem 




Only very little is known about how different forms of intrusions may be developed and maintained 
and how these may interact with other variables in psychological distress. Research in this area is 
currently hampered by a lack of appropriate high quality tools to capture data about intrusions. As 
outlined above, further investigations in this area may benefit from the development of a measure 
of the tendency to experience intrusions in different forms or a prospective measure of the 
occurrence of intrusions such as through diaries or experience sampling. 
The   findings   from   the   current   study   suggest   that   there   may   be   a   link   between   an   individual’s  
preference for processing style (verbal or non-verbal) and their level of worry. There is clearly a need 
for replication of this finding using a validated measure. The Verbalizer-Visualizer Questionnaire 
(VVQ; Richardson, 1977) is one such measure, however the authors themselves acknowledge that a 
major problem revealed by factor analysis is that whilst it sets out to measure the tendency to use 
either a verbal or non-verbal processing style, verbal items are actually measure verbal ability (as 
opposed to tendency to use a verbal processing style). There is therefore a need for revision of the 
existing measure or development of a new measure to facilitate further research on this variable. In 
particular, in light of the age range of the current study, it would be informative to compare groups 
of worriers and non worriers of different ages. 
Worry, cognitive fusion and psychological inflexibility 
Strong correlations were found between worry, cognitive fusion and psychological inflexibility in this 
sample. Due to the difficulties generalising from a relatively homogenous older adults sample to the 
general population, replication of this finding in different populations is needed to confirm this 
finding. One interpretation of the link between these variables and their relationship to intrusions 
has been put forward, further studies are required to confirm and extend these findings in order to 
clearly establish the roles these variables play in the many different manifestations of worry. Given 
the known relationships between measures of worry, cognitive fusion and psychological flexibility 
with measures of depression symptomatology, it will be of paramount importance to include a 




4.6 Clinical implications 
Until relatively recently, the most effective, and most widely available, treatments for GAD were 
applied relaxation and cognitive-behaviour therapy (CBT). A review of psychological treatments for 
GAD reported the lowest recovery rate at post-treatment for applied relaxation (34%) and cognitive 
therapy (36%), followed by CBT (46%), the most effective treatment was shown to be meta-cognitive 
treatment (MCT) with 80 per cent of patients meeting recovery criteria based on PSWQ scores, 
although promising, this was based on only ten patients (Fisher, 2006).   
Treatment of psychological distress with worry as a prominent feature has in the past focused on 
modifying worry itself, or beliefs about worry. The findings of the current study give an indication 
that worry itself may be a symptom of overarching patterns of psychological inflexibility and cognitive 
fusion. Whilst these findings require replication and extension, this is consistent with preliminary 
findings for the effectiveness of Acceptance Based Behaviour Therapy (ABBT). Acceptance Based 
Behaviour Therapy (ABBT) is a recent development in the treatment of GAD and is based on 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) and specifically the Acceptance Model of GAD and worry 
(Roemer et al., 2005). Preliminary results indicate 78 per cent of patients no longer meeting GAD 
criteria, with 77 per cent meeting criteria for high end-state functioning (Roemer et al., 2008). Unlike 
the majority of existing treatments for GAD, ABBT does not specifically target worry. Suggested 
mechanisms of change are acceptance of internal experiences and engagement in meaningful 
activities (Hayes et al., 2010).  
The findings of the current study support the relevance of ACT constructs, including psychological 
inflexibility and cognitive fusion, to older adults; and indicate that these constructs relate in a 
meaningful way to the experience of worry. Whilst the application of ACT specifically to older adult 
groups has, so far, been little studied, a pilot study applying ACT to treatment of GAD in older adults 
concluded that it is feasible to use ACT with this age group. Treatment gains were substantially 
smaller than those found with younger adults and the authors suggest that adapting treatment to 
include fewer, but more relevant, elements may be more effective (Wetherell et al., 2011).  
The finding that a proportion of older people do experience intrusive memories, images and 
thoughts, and that these may be distressing, particularly for those with higher levels of cognitive 
fusion, suggests that it may be worthwhile   to   routinely   inquire   about   a   patient’s   experience   of  
intrusions during assessment. Findings from previous research about the therapeutic value of 
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working directly with intrusive memories (Brewin et al., 2009) points towards these experiences as 
being potentially important targets for therapeutic intervention in cases where they are reported.   
In summary, intrusive memories, images and thoughts should be inquired about in routine 
assessment and, when severe, may provide targets for therapeutic intervention in their own right. A 
greater understanding of the variables and processes involved in development and maintenance of 
worry may help to maximise the effectiveness of treatment for conditions involving the worry process 
which include GAD, specific anxiety disorders and depression. The present study provides some 
evidence that the use of cognitive defusion and acceptance techniques may be useful for individuals 
with severe intrusive thoughts and memories and for individuals with high worry. It also supports the 
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What thoughts and images 
pop into your mind? 
 
If you are over 60 years old, read on for 






We are looking for people over the age of 60 to take part 
in a research project. The project explores the links 
between images and memories that pop into our minds 
unasked, the way we respond to them, and how much we 
worry. This is perhaps better to illustrate with an 
example: Imagine you are about to go to the 
supermarket. Suddenly an image flashes into your mind of 
standing at the checkout and forgetting the pin number 
for your card. One person might begin to worry about the 
possibility of this happening, and as a result, might make 
sure they have cash with them, or even avoid going 
altogether. Another person may just shrug off the image 
and not think of it again.  
By finding out more about these differences in the ways 
people respond to thoughts and images, we hope to find 
more effective ways of helping people who are troubled 
by distressing thoughts and images, as well as worry. 
 
Taking part in the study involves completing a 
consent form and four short questionnaires as well 
as an interview about symptoms of anxiety and 
depression, and experience of images and memories 
that pop into your mind unasked (intrusive images).   
If you think you might like to take part, or just want 
to find out more, please contact Emma Miller on 
01561 378536 or e.f.miller@sms.ed.ac.uk  
Please pass on information about the project to any 







Participant Information Sheet 
 
An	  exploration	  of	  older	  people’s	  experiences	  of	  intrusive	  thoughts,	  
images and memories, across the spectrum of worry.  
 
The aim of the study is to find out whether images and memories that are 
intrusive, or come to mind as if out of nowhere, are a problem for those over 
60, with varying levels of worry. It will also look at how these images are linked 
to our experience of worry and emotions.  
I would like to invite you to take part in my research study. Before you decide I 
would like you to understand why the research is being done and what it 
would involve for you. I will go through the information sheet with you and 
answer any questions you may have. This should take about 20 minutes. 
Part 1 tells you the purpose of the study and what taking part would involve; 
Part 2 gives you more detailed information about how the study is being 
conducted. 
Please ask if there is anything that is not clear 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The reason for studying intrusive images and memories is to better understand 
the links between imagery, worry and other thinking processes and to develop 
more effective ways of helping those who are experiencing distress. 
Why have I been invited to take part? 
I am looking for around 60 people over the age of 60 to take part in this study. 
Participants will fall into one of two groups, one group who have a diagnosis of 
Generalised Anxiety Disorder, and one group who do not. 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide whether to take part. I will describe the study and go 




ask you to sign a consent form. You can change your mind at any time. You do 
not need to give a reason if you decide to withdraw. Taking part in the study 
will not affect your care or treatment now or in the future.  
What will happen to me if I take part? 
It is always best to take some time to think over the information you have 
been given and to discuss it with family and friends. 
If, after taking time to think about it, you decide you would like to take part in 
the study I will meet with you, in private to answer any questions you may 
have. If you are happy to proceed you will then be asked to complete a written 
consent form.  
Next we will go through a series of  interview questions expected to last for 
around one hour, although we can stop for a break half way through, or at any 
other time you need to. The interview will be in two parts; firstly, you will be 
asked some questions about your experience of symptoms related to mood 
and anxiety; in the second part of the interview you will be asked some 
questions  about your recent experience of memories and images.  
You will then be asked to fill out four short questionnaires which should take 
about half an hour. Each questionnaire asks about different symptoms or 
experiences, one asks about your mood, one about worry, one about your 
emotions and one about how you react to your thoughts. 
This will complete your participation in the study and I will not contact you 
again, other than to send a summary of the findings from the research if you 
would like.  
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
Taking part in any research involves a commitment of your time and some 
inconvenience. This will be kept to a minimum by arranging to meet you as 
close as possible to your home, and in a relaxed and friendly environment.  
Whilst I do not expect anyone to be distressed by taking part in the study, it is 




memories and images upsetting.  In this event, the possibility of a referral to 
the  Older  Peoples’  Psychology  Service  will  be  discussed  with you.  
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
There are not expected to be any direct benefits of taking part in the study. It 
is  however  very  important  that  Older  Peoples’  experiences  and  views  are  
included in research. In taking part in research, you will be helping to add to 
our understanding of the links between worry, imagery and emotions.  
What if there is a problem? 
Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with during the study or any 
possible harm you might suffer will be addressed. The detailed information on 
this is given in Part 2. 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
Yes, we will follow ethical and legal practice and all information about you will 
be handled in confidence. The details are included in Part 2. 
If the information in Part 1 has interested you and you are considering taking 
part, please read the additional information in Part 2 before you decide. 
Part 2 
What will happen if I change my mind about taking part? 
You have the right to ask any questions or to withdraw at any point in the 
study. If you decide to withdraw, any information you have provided will be 
deleted if you wish. You do not have to provide a reason for withdrawing from 
the study. 
What if there is a problem? 
I do not expect anyone to be harmed by taking part in the study. If however 
anyone should feel upset or distressed they will be encouraged to seek support 
either from any mental health professional involved in their care, or to contact 




If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, please speak to myself, or 
one of the supervisors overseeing the study. All contact details can be found at 
the end of this information sheet. 
If you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, the details of how to 
make a complaint to the NHS are also to be found at the end of this 
information sheet.   
In the event that something does go wrong and you are harmed during the 
research  and  this  is  due  to  someone’s  negligence,  then  you  may  have  grounds  
for a legal action for compensation against NHS Lothian or the University of 
Edinburgh, but you may have to pay your legal costs. The normal National 
Health Service complaints mechanisms will still be available to you. 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
All information which is collected about you during the course of the research 
will be kept strictly confidential. All results of the study will be anonymised so 
that you cannot be identified. Your contact details will be kept securely for the 
duration of the study, these will be kept separately from interview and 
questionnaire data. 
If, during the course of the study you disclose information that either a crime 
has been committed or that you, or someone else, is at risk of harm, I would be 
obliged to contact the relevant agencies which may include the police or health 
or social services. If possible this would be discussed with you and an 
appropriate course of action agreed upon. 
Will my General Practitioner be informed? 
Yes, a brief letter will be sent to your GP to inform them that you are taking 
part. If any concerns are raised during the study, regarding your wellbeing, I 
will request your permission to write to your GP again and also to the Older 
Peoples’  Psychology  Service,  if  appropriate. 
As outlined in the section on confidentiality, your GP, as well as any other 
appropriate agencies would be contacted in the event of a disclosure of a 




What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results will be written up and submitted to the University of Edinburgh as 
part of my doctoral thesis. They will also be submitted for publication in a peer 
reviewed journal and may be presented at conferences. All results will be 
anonymised so no-one will be able to identify you or the information you 
provided. 
If you would like a copy of the findings from the research, I will be happy to 
send you a summary written in non-technical language. If you prefer, you can 
request a copy by contacting Emma Miller at the address at the end of this 
information sheet. 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
The research is being sponsored jointly by the University of Edinburgh and NHS 
Lothian.  
Who has reviewed the study? 
All research in the NHS is reviewed by an independent group of people, called 
a Research Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This study has been 
reviewed and given a favourable opinion by Lothian Research Ethics 
Committee. 
Further information and contact details 
For further information about this study: 
Chief Investigator 
Emma Miller 
Clinical Psychology,  
University of Edinburgh 








01561 378 536 
 
Academic Supervisor      
David Gillanders 
Academic Director 
Doctoral Programme in Clinical Psychology 
University of Edinburgh 




0131 651 3946 
david.gillanders@ed.ac.uk      
     
Should you wish to speak to someone not directly involved in the 
study, please contact: 
Dr Ken Laidlaw 
Professional  Lead  for  Older  Peoples’  Psychology  Services 
Jardine Clinic 
Royal Edinburgh Hospital 
Edinburgh, EH10 5HF 
Tel: 0131 537 6776        
For advice on whether to take part: 
Please feel free to speak to family, friends or any health professional involved 
in your care. The chief investigator will be please to answer any further 
questions or concerns you may have. 
Who to approach if you are unhappy with the study: 
In the first instance, please speak to the chief investigator or one of the 
supervisors overseeing the study.  




The Independent Advice and Support Service: 
0131 558 3681 
The NHS Lothian complaints department for Elderly Mental Health: 
0131 537 9522 or 0131 537 9523 
Or contact 
NHS Lothian Complaints Team 
2nd Floor 
Waverley Gate 
2-4 Waterloo Place 
Edinburgh 
EH1 3EG 





Consent Form  
An exploration of older	  people’s	  experiences	  of	  intrusive	  thoughts,	  
images and memories, across the spectrum of worry.  
Chief Investigator, Emma Miller, Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
 




I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet dated 
01/04/2012 (version 4) and had the opportunity to ask questions and have 
had these answered satisfactorily.  
 
  
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw at 
any time, without giving a reason.  
 
  
I understand that if I withdraw this will not affect my care or treatment now 
or in the future 
 
  
I understand that should I share information which causes concern about 
my well-being or the well-being of others this information may be shared 
with my GP or other appropriate agencies. 
 
  
I understand that anonymised findings may be published and that 
information identifying me will remain confidential 
 
  
I consent to audio recording of my interview and for recordings to be 
retained until the end of the study                                                    
 
I agree to take part in this study  
  
  




Investigators  signature…………………………………………………. Date………. 
 








x Ethics Application 
x Ethics provisional Approval 
x Reply to Ethics 
x Ethics Approval 
x Amendment Application 
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Telephone 0131 536 9000 
Fax 0131 536  
www.nhslothian.scot.nhs.uk 
 
Miss Emma F Harris 
Specialist Psychological Practitioner 
Older Adults Psychology Service 
Jardine Clinic 
Royal Edinburgh Hospital, Edinburgh 
EH10 5HF 
Date 24 March 2010 
Our Ref  
Enquiries to Lyndsay Baird 
Extension 89061 
Direct Line 0131 536 9061 




Dear Miss Harris 
 
Study Title: An exploration of the presence and nature of intrusive 
imagery in older people with Generalised Anxiety 
Disorder 
REC reference number: 10/S1102/9 
Protocol number: v.1 
 
The Research Ethics Committee reviewed the above application at the meeting held on 10 March 




The documents reviewed at the meeting were: 
  
Document    Version    Date    
REC application  v.2.  11 February 2010 
Protocol  v.1  25 January 2010 
Investigator CV    11 February 2010 
Participant Information Sheet  v.2  02 February 2010 
Participant Consent Form  v.2  02 February 2010 
Questionnaire: Geriatric Depression Questionnaire       
Questionnaire: PSWQ Questionnaire       
Questionnaire: AAQ Questionnaire       
Questionnaire: Non Validated Questionnaire       
Questionnaire: CFQ Questionnaire       
Student C.V.       








This research aims to explore the possible role of intrusive imagery in Generalised Anxiety 
Disorder (GAD) in older adults, by comparing a group of older people with a diagnosis of GAD and 
a control group without a diagnosis of GAD.  The Committee considered that the main ethical 
issues were the lack of information related to the processes the researcher would follow if 
participants become distressed or if the control group participants exhibited symptoms of GAD, the 
confidentiality of the Community Group interviews held in cafes and the system for secondary 
contact of the community group.  After discussions with the researcher it was agreed that the 
participants General Practitioner should be informed of their participation in the study.  The 
researcher informed the committee that a schedule for the proposed interview had been developed 
and she would submit this.  The committee suggested that the Participant Information Sheet was a 
little vague and unhelpful and the researcher agrred to redraft the paperwork. 
 
The Committee would be content to give a favourable ethical opinion of the research, subject to 
receiving a complete response to the request for further information set out below. 
 
The Committee delegated authority to confirm its final opinion on the application to a meeting of 
the sub-committee of the REC. 
 
Further information or clarification required 
 
The Committee agreed to offer a favourable ethical opinion of the research, subject to receiving a 
complete response to the request for further information below.  Authority to consider the response 
and to confirm the Committee’s final opinion has been delegated to the Sub-Committee: 
x Clarify what processes you will follow if a participant becomes distressed, the process for 
assisting control participants that may show symptoms of GAD, and what treatment would 
be recommended.     
x Reassure the Committee that the Community Group interviews will be held in a private 
room including details of the sites.   
x Produce a General Practitioners Letter or Information Sheet.  
x Provide topic guides for your interview sessions.   
x The consent form should include a specific sentence related to using audio visual 
equipment.   
x As discussed at the meeting ‘Geriatric’ should be removed from title of the Depression 
Rating Scale if it does not conflict with copyright.  The Patient name question should also 
be replaced with a coding system. 
x Reassure the Committee that if a participant states that they do not hear voices they will 
move onto the appropriate questions rather than going through a large number of questions 
related to this subject.   
x Add the site details into Part C the IRAS form.   
x The Participant Information Sheet:  
o Is too vague, it should focus on will happen to the participant when they take part in 
the study.  
o Font size should be increased. 
o Should offer participants copies of the results of the research in lay language including 
contact details of where they can be obtained.   
x As discussed at the meeting any secondary contact with the Community Group should be 
made through a general reminder through the Community Group.  
 
 
When submitting your response to the Committee, please send revised documentation where 
appropriate underlining or otherwise highlighting the changes you have made and giving revised 
version numbers and dates.   
 
If the committee has asked for clarification or changes to any answers given in the application 
form, please do not submit a revised copy of the application form; these can be addressed in a 
covering letter to the REC. 
 
The Committee will confirm the final ethical opinion within a maximum of 60 days from the date of 
initial receipt of the application, excluding the time taken by you to respond fully to the above 
points.  A response should be submitted by no later than 16 July 2010. 
 
Membership of the Committee 
 
The members of the Committee who were present at the meeting are listed on the attached sheet. 
 
Statement of compliance  
 
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements for Research 
Ethics Committees (July 2001) and complies fully with the Standard Operating Procedures for 
Research Ethics Committees in the UK.  
 







Professor Peter Hayes 
Chair 
 
Email: lyndsay.baird@nhslothian.scot.nhs.uk  
 
Enclosures: List of names and professions of members who were present at the 
meeting and those who submitted written comments. 
 
 
Copy to: Elspeth Currie 
 
 
South East Scotland Research Ethics Committee 02  
 
Attendance at Committee meeting on 10 March 2010 
 
  
Committee Members:  
 
Name   Profession   Present   Notes    
Miss Sharon Cameron  Nurse  Yes    
Mrs O M A Chiswick  Nurse  Yes    
Professor Peter  Hayes  Professor of 
Hepatology  
Yes    
Dr Calum MacKellar  Director of Research  Yes    
Mr Lindsay Murray  Health & Safety 
Manager  
Yes    
Mr Andy Neustein  Retired  No    
Dr Nigel Ostrowski  General Practitioner  Yes    
Mrs V Prosser  Not Known  No    
Mr Thomas Russell  Consultant 
Neurosurgeon  
No    
Ms Tzyvia Rye  Medical Research  Yes    
Dr Lillian  Schweizer  Geneticist  Yes    
Reverend Donald Stephen  Reverend  Yes    
Mr W O D Walker  Retired  Yes    
  
Also in attendance:  
 
Name   Position (or reason for attending)   
Dr Alex Bailey  Scientific Officer  

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notice of Amendment  IRAS Version 2.0
 18364/363316/13/810/120055
 
      
Headquarters 
Waverley Gate, 2-4 Waterloo Place, Edinburgh EH1 3EG 
 
Chair Dr Charles J Winstanley 
Chief Executive Tim Davison 
Lothian NHS Board is the common name of Lothian Health Board 
Lothian NHS Board South East Scotland Research 
Ethics Committee 02 
 
Waverley Gate 
2-4 Waterloo Place 
Edinburgh 
EH1 3EG 
Telephone 0131 536 9000 




 Date 13 December 2012 
Your Ref  
Our Ref  
 
Enquiries to:   Joyce Clearie 
Extension:      35674  
Direct Line:    0131 465 5674 
Email:   Joyce.Clearie@nhslothian.scot.nhs.uk 
 
 
26 September 2012 
 
Miss Emma F Harris 
Specialist Psychological Practitioner 
NHS Lothian 
Older Adults Psychology Service 
Jardine Clinic 




Dear Miss Harris 
 
Study title: An exploration of the presence and nature of 
intrusive imagery in older people with Generalised 
Anxiety Disorder 
REC reference: 10/S1102/9 
Amendment number:  
Amendment date: 01 August 2012 
 




The members of the Committee taking part in the review gave a favourable ethical opinion 





The documents reviewed and approved at the meeting were: 
 
 Document  Version  Date  
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NHS SSI  IRAS Version 2.0
 18364/121447/6/650/47066/1770658
 
Participant Consent Form: PCF  4  01 April 2012  
Participant Information Sheet: PIS  4  01 April 2012  
Interview Schedules/Topic Guides 2 01 April 2012 
GP Letter /Cons Information  2 01 April 2012 
Protocol  3  01 August 2012 
Notice of Substantial Amendment (non-CTIMPs)    01 August 2012 
  
Membership of the Committee 
 





All investigators and research collaborators in the NHS should notify the R&D office for the 
relevant NHS care organisation of this amendment and check whether it affects R&D 
approval of the research. 
 
Statement of compliance 
 
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements for 
Research Ethics Committees and complies fully with the Standard Operating Procedures 
for Research Ethics Committees in the UK. 
 




















South East Scotland Research Ethics Committee 02  
 
Attendance at Sub-Committee of the REC meeting 2 on September 2012 
 
Name   Profession   Capacity    
Mr Thomas Russell  Retired Consultant Neurosurgeon Expert  
















Professor David E Newby
-_~:b: ."I exploration of the presence and nature of intrusive imagery in older people with--_!: 0 sorder
LREC No: N/A
Eudract: N/A
4 April 2010 Consent: Version 3 dated 14 April 2010
yOU that this study has been approved for NHS Lothian and you may proceed with
ec: :0 the conditions below. This letter provides Site Specific approval for NHS Lothian.
HS Lothian R&D Office must be informed if there are any changes to the study
...... JliP'II!'!~-.=~~~ :0 the protocol, recruitment, funding, personnel or resource input required of NHS
€nts to the protocol will require approval from the ethics committee which approved
5ce when recruitment has closed and when the study has been completed.
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6.,'*$'   PLQV 7KHUHVHDUFKHU1+6RU
FRPPXQLW\VHWWLQJ
(PPD0LOOHU





  PLQXWHV VHOIUHSRUW (PPD0LOOHU
3HQQVWDWHZRUU\LQYHQWRU\   XSWR
PLQXWHV
VHOIUHSRUW (PPD0LOOHU
















































































































































Participant Number:                                           Initial Assessment: Y/N 









1. In the last week have you had any particular memories from a particular 
episode or event in your past that keeps coming back into your mind? (If last 
week was exceptional then ask about a typical week). 
 
YES/NO 
(Prompts – When you were feeling the most depressed or memories of particular 
negative events) 
 
2. What are the two most distressing memories? (If more than 2 then inform the 
patient that we will just be concentrating on the two most distressing memories).   
 
Memory 1 - 
When did this episode happen? How old were you at the time of this memory?   
 
 








Please rate the vividness of your memory for the experience: 
 
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
 
           Hazy                        Normal                       Very clear                             Most clear & 
           memory                   memory                      & vivid memory                  vivid memory                   
 
What are the emotions that you associate with this memory? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
    Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                         Very much so 
 
 
Sad:          Guilty:                                   Ashamed:                     Other (specify):                                                                      
 
Angry:          Anxious:       Helpless: 
 
 




Participant Number:                                           Initial Assessment: Y/N 




When you have this memory, does it feel like it is not just a past event but is happening all 
over again right now? 
 
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
    Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                         Very much so 
     
When you remember the event do you re-experience emotions the same as, or very similar to, 
those that were felt in the actual event? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
    Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                         Very much so 
     
 
When you remember the event do you re-experience physical feelings the same as, or very 
similar to, those that were felt in the actual event? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
    Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                         Very much so 
     
How many times did you experience the intrusive memory in the last week? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
None of                                                   Half the                                                     All of 
the time                                                  the time                                                     the time 
 

















Participant Number:                                           Initial Assessment: Y/N 




How much did the intrusive memory interfere with your daily life? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
Not at all                                                 Moderately                                          Severely 
 
How uncontrollable was your intrusive memory in the last week? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
Not at all                                               Moderately                                           Completely 
 
How distressing was your intrusive memory? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
 Not at all                                              Moderately                                            Severely  
 
Memory 2 - 
When did this episode happen? How old were you at the time of this memory?   
 
 







Please rate the vividness of your memory for the experience: 
 
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
 
           Hazy                        Normal                       Very clear                             Most clear & 













Participant Number:                                           Initial Assessment: Y/N 




What are the emotions that you associate with this memory? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
    Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                         Very much so 
 
 
Sad:          Guilty:                                   Ashamed:                     Other (specify):                                                                      
 
Angry:          Anxious:       Helpless: 
 
When you have this memory, does it feel like it is not just a past event but is happening all 
over again right now? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
    Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                         Very much so 
     
When you remember the event do you re-experience emotions the same as, or very similar to, 
those that were felt in the actual event? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
    Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                         Very much so 
     
When you remember the event do you re-experience physical feelings the same as, or very 
similar to, those that were felt in the actual event? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
















Participant Number:                                           Initial Assessment: Y/N 




How many times did you experience the intrusive memory in the last week? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
None of                                                   Half the                                                     All of 
the time                                                  the time                                                     the time 
 




How much did the intrusive memory interfere with your daily life? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
Not at all                                                 Moderately                                          Severely 
 
How uncontrollable was your intrusive memory in the last week? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
Not at all                                               Moderately                                           Completely 
 
How distressing was your intrusive memory? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
 Not at all                                              Moderately                                            Severely  
 
3. IMAGES 
[are you aware that your thinking often consists of mental images or pictures? If 
no, are you aware that your thinking ever consists of mental images or pictures? 
If no, discontinue images section] 
 
1. In the last week have you had any other mental pictures or images that [have 





2. What are the two most distressing images? (If more than 2 then inform the patient 




Image 1 - 
Can you briefly describe what you see in the image? 
Participant Number:                                           Initial Assessment: Y/N 







Please rate the vividness of your image: 
 
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
 
           Hazy                        Normal                       Very clear                             Most clear & 
           memory                   memory                      & vivid memory                  vivid memory                   
 
Do you experience physical sensations when you have this image? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
    Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                         Very much so 
 
What are the emotions that you associate with this image? 
 
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
    Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                         Very much so 
 
Sad:          Guilty:                                   Ashamed:                     Other (specify):                                                                      
 
Angry:          Anxious:       Helpless: 
 
When you have this image, does it feel like it is not just a past event but is happening all over 
again right now? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
    Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                         Very much so 
     
How many times did you experience the intrusive image in the last week? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
None of                                                   Half the                                                     All of 
the time                                                  the time                                                     the time 
 




Participant Number:                                           Initial Assessment: Y/N 







How much did the intrusive image interfere with your daily life? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
Not at all                                                 Moderately                                          Severely 
 
How uncontrollable was your intrusive image in the last week? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
Not at all                                               Moderately                                           Completely 
 
How distressing was your intrusive image? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
 Not at all                                              Moderately                                            Severely  
 
Image 2 - 








Please rate the vividness of your image: 
 
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
 
           Hazy                        Normal                       Very clear                             Most clear & 












Participant Number:                                           Initial Assessment: Y/N 







Do you experience physical sensations when you have this image? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
    Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                         Very much so 
 
What are the emotions that you associate with this image? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
    Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                         Very much so 
 
Sad:          Guilty:                                   Ashamed:                     Other (specify):                                                                      
 
Angry:          Anxious:       Helpless: 
 
When you have this image, does it feel like it is not just a past event but is happening all over 
again right now? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
    Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                         Very much so 
 
 
How many times did you experience the intrusive image in the last week? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
None of                                                   Half the                                                     All of 
the time                                                  the time                                                     the time 
 













Participant Number:                                           Initial Assessment: Y/N 







How much did the intrusive image interfere with your daily life? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
Not at all                                                 Moderately                                          Severely 
 
 
How uncontrollable was your intrusive image in the last week? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
Not at all                                               Moderately                                           Completely 
 
 
How distressing was your intrusive image? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
 Not at all                                              Moderately                                            Severely  
 
3. THOUGHT STREAM 
 
Have you been aware in the past week of thoughts that keep coming spontaneously into 
your mind, giving you a similar message each time?  Sometimes the thoughts may just 
comment, or give instructions, or say if something is good or bad.  (If last week was 
exceptional then ask about a typical week). 




A)  Do  you  experience  any  of  this  as  like  a  ‘voice’  speaking  to  you?         YES/NO  
 
(N.B. From now on use ‘voice’ or ‘stream  of  thoughts’ or other term, depending on the way 
the respondent prefers to describe it).            
 
B)  Is  there  just  one  ‘voice’  or  are  you  aware  of  more  than  one?  (record the number of 
voices).  
C) What are the two most distressing voices? (If more than 2 then inform the patient that 








Participant Number:                                           Initial Assessment: Y/N 







Voice One - 
What  kinds  of  things  does  this  ‘voice’  say?    (record examples) 





Does  the  ‘voice’  use  your name or refer to you as ‘I’,  ‘you’  or  ‘he/she’?  
 
 
Does its message tend to be the same or does it vary? 
OR Are your thoughts always the same or do they vary? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
 Always                          Mostly                          Mostly the                                  Always the  
 different                       different                        same                                           same    
 




What adjectives would you use to describe the voice?   
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
    Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                         Very much so 
 
Encouraging:                        Rational:                                       Welcoming: 
 
Critical:              Intimidating:                                 Pessimistic: 
 
What emotions do you associate with these thoughts/voices? 
 
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
    Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                         Very much so 
 
 
Sad:          Guilty:                                   Ashamed:                     Other (specify):                                                                      
 





Participant Number:                                           Initial Assessment: Y/N 







How many times did you experience the thoughts/voice in the past week? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
None of                                                   Half the                                                     All of 
the time                                                  the time                                                     the time 
 





How much did the thoughts/voice interfere with your daily life? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
Not at all                                                 Moderately                                          Severely 
 
How uncontrollable were the thoughts/voice in the last week? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
Not at all                                               Moderately                                           Completely 
 
How distressing were the thoughts/voice? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
 Not at all                                              Moderately                                            Severely  
 
Voice 2 - 
What  kinds  of  things  does  this  ‘voice’  say?    (record examples) 












Participant Number:                                           Initial Assessment: Y/N 







Does its message tend to be the same or does it vary? 
OR Are your thoughts always the same or do they vary? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
 Always                          Mostly                          Mostly the                                  Always the  
 different                       different                        same                                           same    
 
Is  it  the  ‘voice’  of  someone  you  know?  (If so, who?) 
 
 
What adjectives would you use to describe the voice?   
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
    Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                         Very much so 
 
Encouraging:                        Rational:                                       Welcoming: 
 
Critical:              Intimidating:                                 Pessimistic: 
 
What emotions do you associate with these thoughts/voices? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
    Not at all                       A little                           Somewhat                         Very much so 
 
Sad:          Guilty:                                   Ashamed:                     Other (specify):                                                                      
 
Angry:          Anxious:       Helpless: 
 
How many times did you experience the thoughts/voice in the past week? 
  
 
        0      
10       20        
30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
None of                                                   Half the                                                     All of 
the time                                                  the time                                                     the time 
 




Participant Number:                                           Initial Assessment: Y/N 










How much did the thoughts/voice interfere with your daily life? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
Not at all                                                 Moderately                                          Severely 
 
How uncontrollable were the thoughts/voice in the last week? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
Not at all                                               Moderately                                           Completely 
 
How distressing were the thoughts/voice? 
  
 
        0      10       20        30        40       50         60       70         80        90       100 
 
   
 Not at all                                              Moderately                                            Severely  
 
 
 
